|Full Title:||Theoretical Pragmatic and Philosophical Linguistic Insights into Irony and Deception|
|Start Date:||26-Jul-2015 - 31-Jul-2015|
|Meeting Email:||click here to access email|
|Meeting Description:||The overarching topic of this panel is untruthfulness, specifically communicating what the speaker believes to be untrue/false, which may be overt or covert from the hearer’s perspective. Overt untruthfulness shows in utterances to whose content the speaker does not subscribe, which the hearer is meant to recognise in order to infer implicit meanings, as is the case with irony. On the other hand, covert untruthfulness encompasses communicative strategies orientated towards deceiving the hearer and rests on the latter’s not acknowledging the speaker’s explicit or implicit communication of false beliefs.
Both irony and deception have garnered a lot of scholarly attention, but numerous problems are yet to be resolved. Each of these notions invites numerous definitional and classificatory problems. According to the well-entrenched classical definition, in irony, the intended meaning is opposite to the literal one. However, irony shows numerous manifestations which necessitate considerable reformulations, if not rejection, of the standard view. The mechanism of negation/opposition not only shows many subtypes but also is not always in operation. On the other hand, deception may be defined as causing the hearer (to continue) to hold a belief which the speaker believes to be false. It shows numerous manifestations, both verbal and non-verbal, each of which gives rise to many discussions on its underlying mechanisms and intrinsic characteristics.
|Linguistic Subfield:||Philosophy of Language; Pragmatics|
| This is a session of the following meeting:
14th International Pragmatics Conference
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