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LINGUIST Network wrote: > > LINGUIST List: Vol-10-1876. Mon Dec 6 1999. ISSN: 1068-4875. > Date: Sun, 05 Dec 1999 18:44:03 -0800 > From: "Patrick Farrell" <pmfarrellMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueucdavis.edu> > Subject: Re: 10.1855, Disc: What Exactly Are Allophones? > Now, this doesn't prevent "allophone" from ALSO being used in such a way as > to designate one of the things that plays a role in an allophony > relationship. Once we have established that we are talking about the people > who are members of a particular club, we can talk about counting members, > seeing members, talking to members, etc. Why? Because "member" can be used > to designate the things that are in a given membership relation. Similarly, > "allophone" could be and perhaps is used to designate the phones that are in > a given allophonic relation with a phoneme (and/or other phones). Once we > have established that we are considering the phones [x] and [y], which are > allophones of /z/ (relational use of "allophone"), we could talk about the > distribution of the allophones [x] and [y] (thing-designating use of > "allophone"). Thus, there is a sense in which Jorge and advocates of the > "allophone is thing" stance are surely right. People at least could use > "allophone" in such a way as to designate something conceived of as a thing. Indeed this is the difference between everyday talk and precision required of science. Normally we'd say things like: 1. Susan is human. 2. Saturn is a car. 3. Taunus is a Ford. 4. Fido is a dog. but not 5. An apple is an apple. The differences are that we do not ordinarily name our apples. To see this let's look at what we mean by these words. Those who bring up the concept that allophones, phones, phonemes are "abstract" things really mean that they are "sets" (more or less). The reason for this, we are told, is that nobody hears a phoneme for it is an abstract thing and we only hear specific instantiations (sample functions in probability theory, or "tokens" in computational linguistics and computer science). We see that in (1) Susan is a token/member of the set human. In (2) Saturn is a member/subset of the set "car". In (3) Taunus is a member/subset of the set "Ford". In (4) Fido is a specific example of the set "dog". But (5) sounds really stupid because it is so trivially true. If on the other hand we pointed to some object on a table and said; 6. That thing is an apple. then again we have asserted that some specific object is a member of the set "apple". But we should not overdo it. Because we can get stuck in some nasty mind loops, for example: Nobody has seen a vehicle because it is an abstract concept. There are examples of them, say, like cars, buses, trains, trucks. But nobody has seen any of these either, because they are also sets, and they have specific examples, such as Saturn, Ford, Volkswagen, etc. But nobody has seen these either because they are also sets, and they have as members abstract objects like, Taunus, Corolla, etc. But then again, these are also sets, so we eventually get down to specific examples/tokens such as "My Saturn", "Jane's Honda". These are specific concrete objects. The rest are not. Exactly in the same way, only specific realizations, recordings of speech sounds exist. Phonemes, phones, and probably allophones (except for those that are specific realizations) are all "abstract" in the same sense, i.e. they are sets. - M. Hubey, Computer Science Email: hubeyh
mail.montclair.edu Backup:hubeyh
alpha.montclair.edu WWW Page: http://www.csam.montclair.edu/Faculty/Hubey.html
or, The Allophonic Tower of Babel [Ahmad R. Lotfi writes:] <<I guess this theme has been the most popular one on the list for the whole year (though most probably NOT the most important one). But why is it so? I doubt it is (as somehow suggested) due to this linguistic education of ours. It's simply because we linguists today have so little in common to talk about. This divergence of interests can be primarily a symptom of a crisis rather than the maturity of the science of language. We've become so much involved in our own 'field of specialty' that linguistics is already on its way to turn into a private science. I think that's why Linguists have welcome allophones so warmly: they come from the already scarce terminolgy we have inherited from the 'wise' linguists of the past. Ironically enough, and in want of a common language, scientists of *language* are 'babbling' (rather than talking) among themselves with the very rare occasion of some good old words of the past (like 'phone', 'phoneme', and 'allophone') heard from time to time: does it mean the tower of Babel may be left unfinished another time?>> [moonhawk] I welcome this as one of the most brilliant and insightful comments yet put forth in this thread. Is there indeed a linguistics field any more, or are there only linguisticses? Have we gone beyond mutually understandable to mutually unintelligible lects of linguistics? As we delve, each in our own way, into the meaning-full heart of the human cosmos, we find we can no longer report our findings to each other intelligibly, lacking a common metalanguage with which to speak of language -- as shown by our dear, confused allophone, now not knowing, in our collective professional mind, what to be: whether to be a "state" or a "process", a "thing" or a "relation", and if a "relation" whether that will ultimately be seen as another "state" or "thing" by those so inclined. [Jorge Guitart writes] <<PPS Message to Dan (who thinks that allophones are relations): Can relations have phonetic features? We speak in English of the aspirated allophone of /p/ as opposed to the unaspirated one. In Spanish we have the approximant allophone of /b/ as opposed to the plosive one, etc.>> [moonhawk] Here's a radical idea: what if "allophone of" is a generic way, from the phone point of view, of saying it's related to one or more phonemes, while from the phoneme point of view we specify that same relationship by terms like assimilation, complementary distribution, free variation. I.e., when we say "flap is an allophone of /t/ in American English" or "flap is an allophone of /r/ in British English," they are shorthand ways of stating that there is a relationship between phone and phoneme without having to specify exactly what relationship it is, in which contexts it will be found, etc. I'm not sure what it would mean for allophones to relate to one another, or why one would need that, when allophones are seen from a thing perspective, though when seen from a process perspective I can, as rules sequencing with each other. So do relations have phonetic features? Well, do rules "have" phonetic features? I think not. They USE the phonetic features; they ASSUME them; but they don't HAVE them -- only the phones they're working with have phonetic features, just as the phonemes have phonemic features. Well, except that "have" is tricky: we must remember that it is WE who project all of these distinctions onto both what we think we hear and those realms of the unseen and unheard which we try to make visible. And WE can come to the issue from dramatically different places. My experiences in the field with Cheyenne in the '70s -- developing an orthography, dictionary and K-4 curriculum -- nearly force me to come from a different place on the allophone issue than someone who has worked exclusively with phonological theories and prepared data, for instance. In physics this is known as putting the observer back into the equations. So maybe there's room for two different definitions of allophone in the linguisticses after all -- one, the classical one, which is good for actually doing fieldwork and analyzing the data, and another, more modern or post-modern, which is good for ... forgive me -- I guess I'm still not clear what use an "allophone as a thing" is, so I won't be able to complete that sentence. Maybe someone can complete it for me. ;-) The above was composed before seeing Patrick Farrell's comments, which I heartily enjoyed, of course -- and especially his final points: [Patrick Farrell writes:] <<In fact, is there any real issue? Words are often polysemous. One of the ways they can be polysemous, apparently, is in alternating between designating a certain relation among things and the things that are in that relation, much like "hammer" alternates between designating a process involving a certain kind of instrument and the instrument used in that process. Of course, I take it that one of Dan's points is that it is ONLY the English-contingent fact that "allophone" is a noun that leads us to associate a superfluous thing-designating concept with it and maybe even to consider this concept its central or primary sense and to think that the word is needed to designate some kind of thing that exists in the world independent of our conceptualization of it. I don't dispute this point.>> [moonhawk] 'Nuff said. warm regards, moonhawk Dan Moonhawk Alford <dalfordMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issuehaywire.csuhayward.edu> CSU Hayward, CIIS, JFKU Visit Moonhawk's webpage at <http://www.sunflower.com/~dewatson/alford.htm> for recent presentations and hard-to-find classic articles.
Patrick Farrell wrote Two points of view concerning "allophone" are expressed in the following: > > >>JORGE SAID > > > Saying that an allophone is a relation is negated by saying that X is an > > > allophone of Y in language Z, since X is ***something****. > > >DAN RESPONDED > > You've totally misunderstood me. I specifically put brackets around the > > [X], which you've abandoned; too bad, since the brackets say, universally > > to linguists, that the [X] is a PHONE. Perhaps I should have written it > > out more clearly: The phone [X] is an allophone OF the phoneme /Y/. I was > > trying to say that "allophone" by itself is misleading, assisting us to > > imagine that it is a thing, whereas "allophone of" points more directly to > > its use as a relation between two things, phone and phoneme. "Allophonic" > > would be even more preferable for seeing its relationship role. > > It seems pretty clear to me that there is a sense in which Dan is surely > right. It would be pretty weird to say "The word I just heard her say > consisted of three allophones," whereas it would be OK to say "The word I > just heard her say consisted of three phones/phonemes." Why? Because > allophony is fundamentally a relational concept. "Allophone" is quite like > the word "member". If someone asked me to list all the things in the world, > I wouldn't say "whales, pine trees, members, ..." Why? because "member" is > an inherently relational concept. It designates the relation that exists > between a group and its constituents. By the same token, if asked to list > the things that make up languages, I would say, perhaps, "phones (or > phonemes), words, sentences, etc.", but not "allophones, words, sentences, > etc." "Allophone" (which is used generally in the predicate phrase "be > allophone of") primarily designates the relation that exists between phones > and phonemes. > > Now, this doesn't prevent "allophone" from ALSO being used in such a way as > to designate one of the things that plays a role in an allophony > relationship. Once we have established that we are talking about the people > who are members of a particular club, we can talk about counting members, > seeing members, talking to members, etc. Why? Because "member" can be used > to designate the things that are in a given membership relation. Similarly, > "allophone" could be and perhaps is used to designate the phones that are in > a given allophonic relation with a phoneme (and/or other phones). Once we > have established that we are considering the phones [x] and [y], which are > allophones of /z/ (relational use of "allophone"), we could talk about the > distribution of the allophones [x] and [y] (thing-designating use of > "allophone"). Thus, there is a sense in which Jorge and advocates of the > "allophone is thing" stance are surely right. People at least could use > "allophone" in such a way as to designate something conceived of as a thing. > > In fact, is there any real issue? Words are often polysemous. One of the > ways they can be polysemous, apparently, is in alternating between > designating a certain relation among things and the things that are in that > relation, much like "hammer" alternates between designating a process > involving a certain kind of instrument and the instrument used in that > process. > > Of course, I take it that one of Dan's points is that it is ONLY the > English-contingent fact that "allophone" is a noun that leads us to > associate a superfluous thing-designating concept with it and maybe even to > consider this concept its central or primary sense and to think that the > word is needed to designate some kind of thing that exists in the world > independent of our conceptualization of it. I don't dispute this point. > > Patrick Farrell Jorge Guitart replies Thank you, Patrick, for your very clear distinctions. I wonder if you would be opposed to my telling students that at the observable level, a word is in 'allophones' (rather than in phones) while at the mental level it is in 'phonemes'. It is in allophones because every sound represents a phoneme. An allophone is a representative of some phoneme. Let's say you have a social club and there are several committees that are in charge of the different activities of the club. Only club members can be committee members. Now, member is, as you say, a relational concept (cf. it being a relation, a la Dan). I can say that every committee is composed solely of members and I can say that every committee has three members. I don't have to say 'of the club'. It is 'understood'. How is 'member' different from 'allophone'? I look at a transcription of English 'pop-up' as in baseball. The first p is marked as aspirated and the last as unreleased; the middle p is not marked at all, by convention. Let's say the vowels are somehow marked with some kind of detail,e.g. length (the main-stressed vowel is a bit longer than the unstressed one, say) Do you mean to tell me that I cannot say to someone to whom I am trying to teach the meaning of allophone "Look, this is all alophones"? Notice the singular, 'this is', not 'these are'.To me it is like saying' This form I am pointing to is all "in allophones".' If I remember correctly the original query was how to define 'allophone' for someone who doesn't know what they are. I would go for the thingy thing: For any phoneme, its allophones are the sounds that speakers perceive as identical even though they are physically different. Substitute phones for sounds if you wish. And of course a given sound/phone can in one instance be the allophone of phoneme X and in another instance the allophone of phoneme Y since real people do not respect biuniqueness. To insist: since the important thing is the identity, 'allophone' is a psychological entity, not a physical one. I have no quarrel with saying that it (whatever 'it' refers to) enters into a relation. Surely it does. But it is not a relation itself. Best Jorge JorgeMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue