Editor for this issue: Karen Milligan <karen
linguistlist.org>
Wow, that was quite a rebuttal! I appreciate the time and effort that must have gone into it. I'm not going to try to rebutt Larry as much as I'll try (in the spirit of Mark Hubey's suggestions in contribution # 11617) to come to some kind of common ground between our positions as presented earlier. First, it seems to me that both Larry and I conflated two separate issues; namely, that of phonemic analysis (PA) and that of teaching linguistics to beginning students (via PA?). To make matters worse, I also brought POS into the argument (or did both of us?) Concerning the latter (i.e., teaching linguistics), it does not behove me to tell anyone how to do this; we all have our experience and our ideas and ideals. Perhaps more important, each instructor (I'm using the term here in the sense of "one who instructs") has his own personal style, and thus, what works for one usually does not work for another. My main concern in this regard was that I had experienced too many linguistics instructors who seem to think that "overtly teaching any theory is bad for beginning students", and some of Larry's remarks sounded to me very much in this direction, as I tried to point out. BTW, Larry, isn't the fact that "an equation should have a quantity on each side of the equal sign, and ... those two quantities should ... be equal" an aspect of the theory of algebra/of equations? The same can, I think, be said of "the importance of units" and the fact that they have to be of the same kind/size, for that, too, is part of (mathematical?) theory. IOW, we very often have to teach basic theory (of a related area) before we can get into "the real thing" (linguistics, in this case). There is another issue worth noting here: In my teaching experience the students in intro courses were almost exclusively humanities majors, who had no real idea about POS, scientific method etc. At best, they had vargue notions resembling the Logical Positivist notions of scientific inquiry, probably picked up in high school. This is why I, at any rate, have been at pains to present them with a more adequate view of science, and also to make them understand that in everyday life we don't proceed all that differently from the way we do in science, in the sense that we hold theories and that these theories guide most of our endeavors. (More about this later, in connection with POS.) Before turning to PA and POS, I want to briefly take up a point Mark Hubey made (#11.617); namely, that of inexact use of terms. In my case, it was perhaps rather "unstated assumptions", but that amounts to much the same thing: confusion and/or misunderstandings. Mainly this is so in two areas: Dealing with PA as though it was a unified position, and not clarifying what I meant by "no data without theory". As to the former, the mistake was perhaps a natural one for an American linguist, for most of us know only one PA: "Neo Bloomfieldianism". And Bloomfield was certainly influenced by Log Pos thinking (via Wundt)! Sapir (and Whorf) were never really considered Phonemicists by most of us. So, when I said the PA is inadquate and incorrect, I was thinking of the positions that held "the separation of levels", "once a phoneme, always a phoneme", and all that. Forgetting that, particularly for European linguists, there are many other kinds of PA. Note, BTW, that I was not arguing against (all of) PA as such, I was arguing against the inadequate view of "how we do science", propagated by Log Pos and accepted by some (American) practitioners of PA. As for the latter, I was thinking in terms of collecting data in experiments. That is, I tried to discredit the classical Log Pos picture of the scientific method that says that we go out and collect data (actually, that we perform experiments in order to collect data), and once we have a sufficient or adequate amount of those, we try to construct an explanation. This certanly is not the way linguists collect their data! On the contrary, we seem to be overburdened by theoretical preconceptions (usually incorrect ones) before we even start collecting data. Think of Jesuit grammars of Amerindian languages like Quechua, or of Japanese, or your own example of ergative lgs. Or of the problems Western linguists have with the notion "word" in Sino-Tibetan lgs. I remember Pawley (an Australian linguist) presenting a paper about a Papuan language, which, he claimed, has some forty-five stems (roots?), which are combined to make up all the concepts the language "needs". Now, you will probably say that all of these are examples of "data without theory", but I can equally well say that they are examples of inadequate theories being confronted with data they cannot explain. The point is not that there are data we can't explain within a given theory (that's old hat), the point, at least the one I was and am trying to make, is that what guided us in collecting these data was a theory, one that later turned out to be inadequate, to be sure. And that's how "progress in science" comes about: in the realization that a given (currently held) theory is unable to explain certain data and that, therefore, it needs to be extended, revisedd, whatever. Now, please, don't think I'm naive enough to think that there are no "unexplained phenomena" for currently held theories. There are, and in all areas of scientific enquiry I know of. But, as we all know, constructing a theory is not an easy matter! There are some points where Larry is not quite accurate (fair) in his critique. Thus, I never advocated that linguists should "ape what we think the physicist (or anybody else) might be doing, and ... allow ourselves to be hypnotized by ... magisterial pronouncements of some group of philosophers..." Nor did I say, think, or even imply that "Newtonian physics is today dismissed by phycisists as a laughable relic." I didn't know that it's still taught in basic courses, though it was certainly so taught when I was an undergraduate. I know that it very adequately explains many aspects of the physical universe (rockets to Mars, too, but that's technology, not science), and it appeals to common sense. And there's an interesting parallel with PA: it, too, appeals to common sense. Perhaps what we should learn from the phycists is a little more tolerance for what we may want to call "partially adequate theories" for use in intro ling courses. As long as they're not patently and obviously false, like Neo Bloomfieldianism's "separation of levels", etc. This brings us to a major (and my last) point, one that has been raised repeatedly by various listers (e.g., Ahmad Lohtfi, Carnie, and, if I understand him correctly, Moonhawk), and implied by Larry and me: Many of us are none-too-tolerant of any ling theory not embraced by ourselves, and many of us are also intolerant of any but the latest theory. Perhaps this has to do with our late arrival on the scientific scene and the attendant insecurity, and with the many popular misconceptions about our discipline. The fact that "grammarians" have been around at least since Panini does not help, because we don't see them (can't sell them to the public) as scientists. American grad schools, as we know, proselytise fearfully and fiercely, probably as a consequence of the factors mentioned earlier, but this certainly reinforces the problem. Like most others, I have no solutions here; I can only exhort (proselytize?). The implied point I tried to make concerning the similarity between scientific enquiry and every day reasoning was made very well by Mark Hubley (#11.617), so I won't go into it again here. I hope this has cleared up some of the misconceptions caused by my earalier contribution. Regards Peter MenzelMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Let me try to squeeze in two points in the perhaps overlong discussion of 'phonemic analysis', especially in response to Menzel (11.429) and Trask (Vol-11.602, Fri Mar 17 2000). First (contra Menzel): data may not exist apart of SOME theory, but this is a pretty broad use of the term theory. Surely some theory must often be assumed at the outset in teaching and learning. Just as (I presume) it is not necessary to get into metaphysical theory, optical theory, and theories of the neurology of vision and other sense perceptions before starting to teach basics of the physical sciences (we reasonably just assume that the elements of these sciences really DO EXIST as we and our instruments perceive them), in teaching phonology we can assume that phones exist. This is a relatively harmless and helpful assumption. (Not ENTIRELY harmless, in fact.) Similarly, in the study of European history the existence of e.g. Napoleon will usually be assumed, even though this is now only very indirectly known -the evidence is quite convincing. And of course students of the PRACTICE of history should, eventually, thoroughly understand the indirect nature of such knowledge and the importance of this for DOING history. Later in the study of phonology, indeed, it will be appropriate to question the existence of phones, and to examine the limits of such claim. But maybe not in the introductory course --if probably so, to some extent. The complexity (even impossibility) of detailed phonetics REQUIRES that phonetic data be abstracted as phonemic quite early in the course -certainly before morphophonemic data come in (authors of some textbooks seem unaware of the difference). Students should understand why and how this is done, so they will understand the considerable evidence of phonology which the theory makes sensible (e.g. allophonic vs. phonemic awareness, categorical perception, aspects of second language learning, writing systems), and, particularly, the principled sense in which a phonetic symbol can represent something which it doesn't in phonetic writing: e.g. /n/ may represent a voiceless, dental, palatal, velar, etc. nasal stop. Second (pro Trask, I think), and the main point: of course phonemics IS theory, and very important theory for linguistics: that only CONTRASTIVE aspects of form are lexical, and that resulting allophonic rules (or constraints) DO EXIST. (Of course by 'phonemics' we don't mean what might rather be called 'classical American structuralist phonemics', with insistence on discovery procedures, biuniqueness, etc. -reasonably a logical positivist theory, as noted by Wojcik in Vol-11-630.) Some generative phonologists don't accept phonemic theory in even this basic sense, yet many of these continue to teach phonemics. Others, it seems, don't teach phonemics -surely with the result that their students are thoroughly confused and may even turn to the study of syntax for consolation. In fact, I don't FULLY accept the theory, because maybe there are acquisitional/transitional stages of cognition in which what is contrastive/primary and what is redundant/secondary are not fully sorted. But the theory that contrast (itself not a simple notion, of course) is the basis of lexical form (another notion needing discussion, but not here -the problem is lexical form underlying alternation) is VERY well supported. Surely it is appropriate to accept phonemics in this sense as part of the groundwork of linguistics. Most introductory linguistics and introductory phonology textbooks show that their authors do so. Grover Hudson Department of Linguistics & Germanic Slavic, Asian & African Languages A615 WH, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1027 phone 517-355-8471, fax 517-432-2736 http://www.msu.edu/~hudson/Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue