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abdnet.com>Dear Everett A significant point in Chomskyan theory to be considered, is that the theory never claims to be tested by concrete evidence about language. It is rather against a single source of data for testing a theory -observations of psychological reality- while many other sources can be found. In this regard Cook says that: 'when UG theory is attacked for relying on intuitions and isolated sentences rather than concrete examples of language use or psycholinguistic experiments, its answer is to go on the offensive by saying that in principle a scientific theory should not predetermine what facts it deals with ;E-language approaches are deficient in the range of evidence they account for compared to I -language theories.' Therefore, we can say that Chomsky's theory is in search of the evidence which is based on 'psychological reality' and not just the direct observation of this psychological reality. 'The question is not whether this issue is psychologically real, but if it is true. Why? because language knowledge is part of the speaker's mind and Chomsky refers to it as 'that branch of human psychology known as linguistics.' With knowledge considered as principles and parameters it is really difficult to believe that when speakers, for example, produce a sentence they actually go through the production of NP and VP, then in the production of VP, they eventually consider the interaction of the head parameter, the head requirement, and the lexical entries of verbs. In other words, as Chomsky puts it : 'An innatist hypothesis is a refutable hypothesis', but rejection or acceptance of the hypothesis is not just based on tangible and observable evidence or phenomena. Rather it could fundamentally be tested by logic and argument. This of course does not mean that everything in this theory gives a feeling of deja vu. No, it means that Chomsky's innate language faculty or his hypotheses are 'not unverifiable assertions but are mostly checkable statements' (Cook 1988). To put it in a nutshell, the attacks to this hypothesis or the accolades given to it are moot points if they are just based on predetermined, observable, tangible evidence or facts. If this theory is going to be debunked or acclaimed at all, the nuts and bolts of it should be judged in a way that the judgement lives up to its premises or its aphorisms. conclusion: Comsky's general ideas are based on specific claims about language and cannot be studied, tested or even understood without pondering on or reflecting upon it especially through some speculations. Therefore, the approach is rather speculative (based on reasoning, not observable facts), though the practical usage of it in many areas cannot be discounted. At the end this incomplete discussion is bedecked by a quotation, from Chomsky himself: It is always necessary to evaluate the import of experimental data on theoretical constructions, and in particular, to determine how such data bear on hypotheses that in nontrivial cases involves various idealization and abstractions. Mohammad Forouzani Member of Azad University Iran.Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
umkc.edu>From Dan Everett-- > just imagine a cosmology that got all the facts > about 'wobbly revolutions' of stars without, say, needing to posit > black > holes. Yes, it certainly would of necessity require imagination, since the history of cosmology [my day job] shows us few if any instances of this sort of Basvoneffian empiricism. The reason why not is simple enough: most cosmologists, indeed, most physicists, ....in fact, most physical and biological scientists are 'causalists', that is, they believe that effects have causes. In the end, Bas simply has to shake his head at the silliness of the rest of us, asking for causes of effects. > Then a theory which posited them would be less attractive Only if you're standing with Bas on this. > - why > accept something which can in-principle never be directly observed as > an > explanation? Two reasons: 1. "in-principle" is a sliding distinction, and usually it slips slides away; and b. "explanation" basically means "causal account", for which, see above. It's amazing how many in-principle hidden causes come to be unhidden. In fact, physical scientists depend on that happening. Witness the neutrino. > In the case of astronomy, one accepts such things because it is > useful to do so. Likewise in quantum theory. But Linguistics ought not > to be > confused with physics. This is probably a good recommendation. In fact, I'm going to accept it and stop talking at exactly this point, since although I know a bit, maybe, about physics and explanations, I don't know nuthin' about UG. George Gale U. Missouri-Kansas CityMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
cogs.susx.ac.uk>I'd like to chip in to this discussion with a blunt question. I find myself on Dan Everett's side, but Dan should not be held responsible for anything I say. Astrophysicists have found it desirable to hypothesize the existence of black holes. The reality of these things is not, it seems, demonstrated beyond all possible doubt, but there exist any number of books telling me exactly what properties black holes must have if they exist, and how we can recognize them if we bump into them. And these books also summarize the evidence that we have so far assembled in support of the reality of black holes -- which is not insignificant, and which in fact is enough to persuade almost all astrophysicists that black holes are real. What about Universal Grammar? Chomskyan linguists have found it desirable to hypothesize the existence of UG. But its reality is clearly not yet demonstrated. Now: where can I find the properties of UG? And what evidence exists for its reality? What pieces of UG are now so firmly established that their reality cannot any longer be seriously doubted by open-minded linguists? In other words, which bits of UG have now passed beyond the stage of being a mere article of faith, and can be persuasively demonstrated to be present in languages all over the planet: in Africa, in the Amazon, in New Guinea, everywhere? And what assurances do we have that this evidence is robust enough to survive the next big revision in Chomsky's thinking, robust enough that linguists fifty years from now will still be obliged to recognize its validity? I ask this question for a good reason. It was only a few years ago that the Chomskyans were asking me to believe that there were dozens of dedicated transformations, such as Passive and Subject-to-Object Raising, and to believe that there were important differences among cyclic rules, pre-cyclic rules, last-cyclic rules, and post-cyclic rules. Apparently all of these beliefs are now on the scrap-heap. And these beliefs, moeover, had superseded a quite different set of beliefs which were in vogue only a few years earlier. So why should I be persuaded that this year's beliefs are for all time? I can't find answers to any of these questions in the many Chomskyan books on my bookshelf. Are there any answers? Or is UG still no more than an article of faith after all? Larry Trask COGS University of Sussex Brighton BN1 9QH UK larrytMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue