Editor for this issue: Lakshmi Narayanan <lakshmi
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Martina Faller has submitted Announcement information about the following conference: Cross-Linguistic Data and Theories of Meaning. The success of recent endeavours such as the meetings on the theme of the Semantics of Under-represented Languages in the Americas (SULA at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, April 2001) shows that there is considerable interest amongst semanticists, and indeed amongst linguists generally, in the problems which arise in confronting semantic theories with data from less-studied languages (Matthewson 2001). A central problem in this research programme is that, in most cases, the linguist will not be a native speaker of the language. We intend that this meeting will concentrate on the conceptual and methodological problems of studying semantics under these conditions. It is generally accepted that languages have the same extensional expressive power in the sense that any language can adequately describe the physical world. In studying cross-linguistic semantics, the question of interest is whether the extensional equivalence of languages also requires intensional equivalence. Some scholars take a universalist perspective and assume intensional equivalency (Barwise and Cooper 1981, Bittner 1994, Keenan and Stavi 1986), whereas others take a relativist perspective and start from the assumption that languages are to a large degree not intensionally equivalent (e.g. Whorf 1941, Grace 1987). In both the universalist and the relativist research tradition, recent research indicates that there is genuine semantic variation across languages, but that this variation is constrained by universal principles (Bach et al. 1995, Bohnemeyer in press, Chierchia 1998, Gumperz and Levinson 1996, Pederson et al. 1998, Wierzbicka 1996, Wilkins & Hill 1995). These findings are not only relevant for cross-linguistic semantics, but also for language acquisition research (Bowerman 1996). One set of questions which we would like to see addressed arise from this: What sort of arguments can be made for either a universalist or a relativist position? If we take the perspective that this is an issue of 'more or less' rather than 'yes or no,' what aspects of meaning are universal, and what aspects are open to variation? Will the answers to these questions require a reconceptualization of what semantics is and how it is structured? What are the consequences for the learnability of languages? Further questions arise with respect to the nature of universals of meaning, if they exist. Are they conceptual units, a vocabulary, or a combinatory system, a syntax, or both? And where do they fit into the language system? Are universals of meaning situated in semantics alone (as Wierzbicka seems to argue), or are they situated in pragmatics (as argued by Levinson 1999), or in both sub-systems? Or are universals of meaning completely outside the linguistic system, a possibility at least acknowledged by Gil (1991). Methodological questions must also be considered. Even the most ardent universalist would allow that some aspects of meaning cannot be transferred from one language to another, or can easily be distorted in the process. What techniques should the researcher therefore use in order to ensure that such distortion is minimized? Can the dependence of the data collection process on language be reduced, either by using non-linguistic stimuli to elicit linguistic data (see e.g. Pederson et al. 1998), or by using linguistic data to elicit non-linguistic reponses. To what extent are techniques used in research on child language and large-scale corpora helpful for cross-linguistic semantic research? Is a metalanguage necessary for interpreting data, and if so, how should it be formulated: in a logical language, or in a natural language (Goddard and Wierzbicka (eds) 1994, 2002)?Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue