Editor for this issue: <>
>Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1991 10:53 PST >From: Scott Delancey <DELANCEYMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueoregon.uoregon.edu> >Subject: autonomous linguistics [...] >Poser and Everett, among others, seem to treat "cognitive" and "functionalist" , >in this context, as synonymous. This is both correct and incorrect (ass >any functionalist or cognitive grammarian would predict, of course; this >is how catgorization works); the essential point in which it is correct >is that all of the various research programs (there are at least three >clearly distinguishable ones) which fall under one or the other of these >terms share an unwillingness to accept a priori the assumption that >significant aspects of morphology and syntax (phonology is likely a >different story) are to be explained only in terms of language-specific >formal priniciples. at the risk of starting yet another long-winded debate, i must point out that there are those of us who consider ourselves 'functionalists' (in that we study the discourse and/or processing functions of linguistic form) who indeed do accept that significant aspects of syntax are to be explained only in terms of (autonomous-)language-faculty-specific formal principles. (i'm assuming that's what scott meant, not 'language-specific'.) furthermore, i for one have never seen any compelling evidence to the contrary, although i have seen a good deal that supports this position. so let's not be too quick to make generalizations about what various 'Xists' do or do not believe, ok guys?
I don't quite agree with Fritz Newmeyer's view that 'formal' and 'functional' approaches are compatible, but maybe that is because half the discussion over these two approaches (trends?) seems to be an attempt to define just what they mean. I did appreciate Fritz's attempt to say where formalists and functionalists differ: > ...As I see it, the task of the > formalist is to characterize the structural possibilities of language, > both universal and language-particular. The task of the functionalist > is to elucidate the principles (largely nonspecific to language) > governing how those structures are employed in actual discourses. > Thus each will find different data relevant to their concerns... First of all, I think that this underscores a point I made recently about the needs of computational linguists. Although NLP research owes a great deal to the work of formalists, NLP researchers really need to be wary of formal linguists who want to sell their programs without really understanding what the customer wants. Being able to enumerate grammatical structures is largely worthless if you can't say how they are employed in actual discourses. You have to know what to do with the structures once you have them. Come to think of it, this point probably applies to most everybody outside the field of linguistics who are interested in linguistic phenomena. They like their skeletons covered with flesh. Secondly, I would like to point out that "the principles...governing how ...structures are employed in actual discourse" cannot possibly be nonspecific to language. They make crucial reference to the structures that are specific to language. The strategy that tells me how to use a relative clause has to know what a relative clause looks like, doesn't it? In order to produce a discourse, I have to know everything there is to know about the structural possibilities of discourses, don't I? It is true that I might understand the ill-formed sentence "I filed the paper after reading" in the way it was intended by the linguistic perpetrator, but does this mean that the rule which tells me that the participle is missing an object is *not* a rule of language use? All I can glean from that sentence is that the speaker doesn't employ the same linguistic strategies that I do. It should not compromise anyone's functionalist ideology to believe that such sentences are low-frequency because they violate regular strategies governing the production of English. So I don't agree at all that "the functionalist...will show little interest" in ungrammatical sentences. The question of grammatical well-formedness is (or ought to be) as important for functionalists as for formalists. If some functionalists disagreed with this point, I would not take it as an endorsement of a formalist approach, but rather as an indictment of their rendering of the functionalist approach. -Rick WojcikMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Fritz Newmeyer correctly notes that functionalist approaches must include some way of deciding the competition between conflicting motives. For example, if we say that the noun preceding a transitive verb in English is typically agential, we need to invoke some competing principle to account for the word order found in the passive. It is true that some functionalist accounts have failed to include such mechanisms. However, there is also a substantial body of work which makes use of the concepts of cue validity, cue cost, and cue strength within a mathematically explicit framework to escape the problem cited by Newmeyer. The full solution to the problem requires at least three levels of analysis. On the first level, one identifies the cues and motives that compete in sentence processing and language change. This level of analysis was already fairly solid in the functionalism of the 1970's. On the second level, one makes a psychometric/psycholingustic commitment to the empirical measurement of cue strength. For an excellent example of this form of analysis, see the fuzzy logic model in "Speech Perception by Ear and Eye" 1987 by Dominic Massaro. On the third level, one makes a commitment to predicting cue strength from the basic cue validity properties of the input to the language learner, as they are attenuated by cue cost factors. The concepts of cue validity and cue cost are applied to data on sentence processing in over a dozen languages in "The Crosslinguistic Study of Sentence Processing" by B. MacWhinney and E. Bates (Eds.) 1989. My guess is that, once he has taken a look at the Competition Model in the book edited by MacWhinney and Bates, Newmeyer will ask for still further commitments regarding the determinants of cue cost. A primary goal of psycholingusitics is the elucidation of detailed facts about cue costs as possible determinants of language universals. However, it believe that the mathematicization of the functionalist model presented in the MacWhinney-Bates book goes a long way toward addressing Newmeyer's concerns and demonstrating that functionalist linguistics need not rest on an empirically shaky foundation. --Brian MacWhinney Carnegie Mellon University [End Linguist List, Vol. 2, No. 105]Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue