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While I'm far from attuned to the ins and outs of political discourse in/concerning Northern Ireland, my intuitions as well as my limited knowledge of the situation lead me to doubt that terms like "Paisleyite" or "Devlinite" are simply innocuous. Do devotee's of Paisley's views in Northern Ireland really think or speak of themselves as "Paisleyites"? I should think they would simply consider themselves good Loyalists, or whatever the appropriate term of approbation would be. It would only be those outside of that world-view who would have a need for a sobriquet like "Paisleyite" to tag them with. The same (or more so) for "Devlinite" -- we are not dealing here with a body of doctrine, or a personality cult, or an organization specifically centered around the person of Devlin -- people whose opponents might tag them as "Devlinites" if asked to describe themselves would be more likely to find a term relating to their cause (e.g. "civil rights activist"? I don't know what terms were actually used) than one tying their beliefs and activities to a specific individual. And then saying something like "We must all ... Paisleyites, Devlinites ..." uses the pejorative sense deliberately, as an appeal to everyone to forget factions and labels for a while. Scott DeLanceyMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Re Mexican queso fondue: Many years ago, a Chinese restaurant I frequented in Philadelphia identified won ton as Chinese kreplach. Michael KacMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Phil Bralich <bralichMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueuhccux.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu> wrote in part: >>An imperative cannot make a command with >>a progressive form of the verb simply because the progressive refers to >>actions in progress while the imperative seeks to initiate an action. He now says that an example like >. . . "Don't be swinging on that bannister," is not an ordinary imper- >ative. It has an emphatic sense that imperatives generally do not. >. . . This emphatic usage quite naturally requires the >progressive because the sense is something like, "I don't want to see you >swinging on (i.e. action in progress) that bannister." The ordinary use >of the imperative, "Don't swing on that bannister" refers to a situation >where the admonition refers to an action that is not in progress and orders >that the action not be initiated. I won't take exception to this, since it is in substantial agreement with what I had said. He continues: >There is still no reason to appeal to >parts of speech to explain these variations. They are a natural consequence >of the use of English tenses. This refers to the question why one cannot say (a) comfortably while parallel (b) is easy: (a) Don't be being horrid (the mommy, on the table)! (b) Don't be swinging on that bannister! The original claim (quoted from Harris) was that sentences like (a) are so uncomfortable that it is conventional to elide "being" to yield (a'): (a') Don't be horrid (the mommy, on the table)! The claim was that the retort "I'm not being horrid!" suggests that both occurrences of "be" must be underlyingly present in (a') as shown in (a). This was really no more than an interesting aside in _A Grammar of English on Mathematical Principles_. No appeal is made to the "parts of speech" adjective, noun, and preposition to explain this. The appeal is rather to the semantics of these words. The reason (a) is uncomfortable is that for relatively more durative operator words it is difficult for us to construe a distinction between punctual and progressive meanings. Note that it is also difficult to say e.g. (c): (c) I am in process of being tall. We must also use "be" with these words to carry their tense morphemes, and they are superficially categorized with the "part of speech" names adjective, noun, preposition, but these are ancillary facts not bases for the argument. For words like "swing" whose meanings are relatively less durative it is easy and natural to make the punctual/progressive distinction. Compare e.g. (d) with (c) above: (d) I am in process of writing this response. But such sentences are uncomfortable, not impossible, as witness (e): (e) I hope we are in the process of our being able to drop this now !-) Bruce Nevin bn
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I would like to clarify my position in order to stave off some criticism and perhaps save some bandwidth. I cited Peirce's discussions of ``law" and ``causation" because his conception of these and very broad; he was concerned with the human as well as the physical sciences, as these additional quotes show: a law; but these laws are modified so easily by the operation of self-control, that it is one of the most patent facts that ideals and thought generally have a very great influence on human conduct. (Collected Papers, 1.348) ...[B]eing governed by a purpose or other final cause is the very essence of [mental] phenomenon, in general. (1.269) The explanation of linguistic change, as I am construing it, is not about laws of physical necessity (though of course there are global limitations, i.e. impossible human articulations) but reasonable actions (witness Whitney, Itkonen, &c.). And I hope that I have not misrepresented Shapiro's argument re: that language has no "goal, defined once and for ever." He writes: "The overarching telos of linguistic change, it would seem... is the establishment of a pattern--not just any pattern but specifically the semeiotic kind Peirce called a diagram..." that is, the goal is diagrammatization or sytematization. Brian Kariger bkarigerMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueaunix.fullerton.edu ~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[B~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[ D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[D~[[~[[B~[[B~[[B
In response to Lee Hartman's question about metaphors, I fancy language to be a (very complex!) chaotic dynamic system of systems which tend toward basins of attraction, being constantly perturbed by the actions of the human will. I thought about this reading James Gleick's book, and recent articles in Scientific American have reinforced this analogy for me. Brian Kariger bkarigerMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueaunix.fullerton.edu