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Alexis Manaster Ramer wondered > . . . if it would help people who are puzzled by the issue of >the size of natural language (like Bruce Nevin, in his latest posting) >if we considered analogies to other areas of human knowledge and >behavior. Just to set the record straight, I hadn't expressed puzzlement. Language is not well defined. The arguments for infinitude refer to an idealization that is well defined. The boundaries between language and nonlanguage are unclear. Is the grammar of a language part of that language? Is the speaker's internal knowledge of a language part of that language? Are the memory traces and neural mechanisms by which speakers control their perception and understanding of a language part of that language? Presumably the muscles, cartileges, and other structures of the vocal tract and ear are not part of language though they are requisite for its control. We must answer "yes" to at least the first two of these questions or else we cannot embrace the idealization that is normal fare in our field--the referent in my "assume a spherical language" post. Of course, one can affirm that the grammar and the speaker's knowledge of it are part of the language without necessarily reducing issues of heterogeneity in language to second-class status as matters of mere performance. For it is in looking along the axis of language variety and language change (just one axis here: the temporal and social dimensions are mutually inextricable) that we see other obvious ways that language is not well defined. Not even in terms of membership in the "set of sentences" is language well defined. A third axis along which language (construed as a set of utterances) is ill-defined is language users' graded judgements of acceptability. At least some of these graded differences in acceptability of word combinations turn out to have a simpler form when you partition a language into sublanguages. In at least some restricted subject-matter domains, especially those of science or technical fields of other sorts, we get something like binary selection restrictions. The graded character of selection in less disciplined usage might be understandable in terms of analogic borrowing from one such domain into another. A fourth axis, or perhaps it is only another way of looking at the third, and certainly it intersects the second, arises through analogic extension of new combinations on the basis of established ones. This is the growing edge of language. It is also the dying edge, as seen in language obsolescence (Fishman's "language shift") in communities and language loss in individuals. It is not at all clear when in these processes a language ceases to be. The converse of this is the retention of relics, dismoored and adrift in the currents and eddies of language change. These are typical not only of obsolescence and loss but also of any normal living language situation. Borrowings from technical sublanguages, perhaps once vivid metaphors, are retained as frozen expressions whose literal meaning is lost. A couple of nautical examples may illustrate: "two sheets to the wind" for staggering drunkenness, where sheets are ropes attached to the clew of a sail for trimming it, which if free "in the wind" leave the sails to luff; or someone "taking a bath" in the stock market, which I surmise is from the wealthy man's experience of capsizing his yacht. This axis, then, is that of metaphors, living and dead. I don't think I have exhausted the possibilities. But perhaps I don't have to. It is only the idealized "spherical" aspect of language that is arithmetic-like and therefore infinite. And of course one could take a perspective on language that sees it in all its heterogeneity and variety over time and space and social space as a single thing, Language. Perhaps these two idealizations are not so very different. Bruce Nevin bnMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issuebbn.com