LINGUIST List 21.4260 Tue Oct 26 2010 Diss: Semantics/Syntax: Coppock: 'The Logical and Empirical ...' Editor for this issue: Mfon Udoinyang <mfonlinguistlist.org> To post to LINGUIST, use our convenient web form at http://linguistlist.org/LL/posttolinguist.cfm. Directory         1.     Elizabeth Coppock , The Logical and Empirical Foundations of Baker's Paradox Message 1: The Logical and Empirical Foundations of Baker's Paradox Date: 24-Oct-2010 From: Elizabeth Coppock <eecoppockgmail.com> Subject: The Logical and Empirical Foundations of Baker's Paradox E-mail this message to a friend Institution: Stanford University Program: Department of Linguistics Dissertation Status: Completed Degree Date: 2009 Author: Elizabeth Coppock Dissertation Title: The Logical and Empirical Foundations of Baker's Paradox Dissertation URL: http://www.eecoppock.info/dissertation.html Linguistic Field(s): Semantics                             Syntax Dissertation Director: Beth Levin Eve V Clark Arnold M. Zwicky Daniel S Jurafsky Ivan A Sag Dissertation Abstract: My dissertation addresses questions of syntactic productivity of the following form: Based on independent (e.g. semantic) properties of a given word, can it be predicted whether the word may occupy a given syntactic position? For example, can it be predicted from the meaning of 'disappear' that it cannot function transitively (*He disappeared the rabbit)? Such questions pertain to the empirical foundations of Baker's Paradox (Pinker 1989, after Baker 1979), which comprises the following premises: (i) Productivity: An infinite number of items can, in principle, instantiate a given syntactic pattern (so long as they satisfy certain criteria); (ii) Arbitrariness: Certain items fail to instantiate the pattern despite meeting the criteria; (iii) No Negative Evidence: Evidence for ungrammaticality is not used in language acquisition. The main focus is on questioning premise (ii). Questioning the premise of arbitrariness is important, because it has consequences for the theory of language learning. Besides potentially leading to a paradox, the existence of arbitrary exceptions has been taken as evidence that the learner is both conservative and attentive (Culicover 1999). Arbitrary exceptions have also served as evidence for the role of statistical preemption and item-specific learning in acquisition (Goldberg 2006; Bowerman and Croft 2008; Wonnacott et al 2008). Although it has consequences for learning, arbitrariness is a purely linguistic claim. Consider the causative alternation ('John broke the glass' vs. 'The glass broke'). Its productivity is governed by certain semantic criteria, but Bowerman and Croft (2008) claim that 'there are verbs that satisfy the [criteria] and yet do not alternate', such as 'totter'. Analogous claims have been made for the dative alternation (Wonnacott et al 2008: 'John donated a car to the church' vs. *'John donated the church a car'), preposition pied-piping and stranding (Culicover 1999: 'This is the bridge from/*off which she jumped'; 'What class did you fall asleep in/*during?'), and the positioning of adjectives (Goldberg 2006: 'She is a sweet/mere child' vs. 'She is sweet/*mere'). Addressing each of these domains individually, I show that under close inspection, the facts can be explained based on general criteria limiting the productivity of the relevant patterns. The first step is to identify the criteria; then it is necessary to determine whether the items in question fit the criteria. A word is an arbitrary exception if it fits the criteria, yet fails to instantiate the pattern. In some cases, good criteria have already been identified, and it is only a matter of finding a way to apply them. In other cases, I identify new criteria. In the chapter on adjectives, for example, I propose the Predicativity Principle: An adjective is syntactically predicative iff it is semantically predicative (for a definition of semantic predicativity that includes gradable adjectives such as 'tall'). Thus 'mere child' is grammatical but not *'The child is mere', with 'mere' in a syntactically predicative position, because it is not semantically predicative. One argument comes from sentence-level adverbs like 'obviously' ('obviously sweet child' vs. *'obviously mere child'). For each item that has been claimed to be an arbitrary exception in the domains considered, I argue that it is not. This removes much of the linguistic argument for item-specific learning. I suggest the explanation-seeking learner as an alternative model: the learner prefers general explanations over arbitrary stipulations. Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue Page Updated: 26-Oct-2010       About LINGUIST    |   Contact Us       While the LINGUIST List makes every effort to ensure the linguistic relevance of sites listed on its pages, it cannot vouch for their contents.