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LINGUIST List 23.4970

Wed Nov 28 2012

Calls: Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Language/Germany

Editor for this issue: Anna Belew <annalinguistlist.org>

Date: 27-Nov-2012
From: Tanja Osswald <cc2013phil.hhu.de>
Subject: Concepts and Categorization in Linguistics, Cognitive Science and Philosophy
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Full Title: Concepts and Categorization in Linguistics, Cognitive Science and Philosophy
Short Title: CC2013

Date: 15-May-2013 - 16-May-2013
Location: Düsseldorf, Germany
Contact Person: David Hommen
Meeting Email: < click here to access email >
Web Site: http://www.sfb991.uni-duesseldorf.de/concepts-and-categorization/

Linguistic Field(s): Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Language

Call Deadline: 15-Jan-2013

Meeting Description:

The study of concepts lies at the intersection of various scientific disciplines, both formal and empiric. Linguistics deals with concepts as basic semantic units of natural (or ideal) languages, aiming to uncover their logical constitution and structural relationships within a given linguistic system. Cognitive science is interested in concepts insofar as they are the constituents of thought - e.g. some kind of mental entities (or objects) - which are used in an explanation of such diverse psychological phenomena like categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. In philosophy the challenge imposed by concepts consists, among other things, in linking a theory of intentional content with a theory of knowledge (e.g. Peacocke's challenging question: 'How can our conception of truth in one area be reconciled with the means by which we think we come to know truth about that area?') and thereby establishing a relationship between reference, knowledge and reality, putting the notion of 'concept' in the broader area of epistemological and metaphysical issues.

In recent research - for instance in the development and discussion of Minsky's and Barsalou's frame theory - linguists, cognitive scientists and philosophers have collaborated more and more to contribute to a unified understanding of concepts and conceptual categorization. As welcome as this interdisciplinary programme is, however, the joint venture suffers (so far) from the fact that it is generally left unclear how exactly the different studies on concepts and categorization undertaken in the participating sciences relate to each other. What do linguists, cognitive scientists and philosophers mean by the notion of 'concept'? Is there some sort of core-theory of concepts and conceptual categorization underlying linguistic, psychological and philosophical research? If not, how and why do the specific theories differ?

Keynote Speakers:

Hans-Johann Glock, Universität Zürich, Switzerland
Matthias Kaufmann, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Albert Newen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany

The workshop is organized by the projects A01 'Mathematical modeling of frames' and A05 'Presuppositions of Frame Theory in the History of Philosophy' in the Collaborative Research Centre CRC 991 'The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition and Science' funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).


Organizational Team:

Tanja Osswald
Lars Inderelst
David Hommen

Call for Papers:

Please submit abstracts in .doc or .pdf format to: cc2013phil.hhu.de.

Important Dates:

Deadline for submission of abstracts (500-700 words): January 15, 2013
Notification of acceptance: March 1, 2013
Workshop: May 15-16, 2013

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