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Martti Arnold Nyman <MANYMANMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueFINUHA.bitnet> writes: > Lrules (or norms-of-language qua institutional or cultural facts) > are typically learned or acquired by experience. But some norms are > so deeply rooted in human nature that their violation is more or less > unnatural and requires an extra effort. (This is one of the basic tenets > of Stampean natural phonology, unless I'm mistaken.) For example, > anyone standing on two hands (instead of two legs) in a cocktail party > would certainly violate a norm of socially correct behaviour. In this > case, the 'two-leg' constraint is almost vacuously a norm, because it > would be hard to violate it... As one who likes Stampean Natural Phonology, I find the 'two-leg' constraint an amusing analogy to the way many linguists formulate their analyses. But I wouldn't want people to get the idea that Natural Phonology takes experience to be the sole factor in language acquisition. Quite the opposite, Stampe has always viewed processes as 'innate' in a biological (vs. Cartesian) sense. That is, phonological processes don't exist as ideas in the head of the infant at birth. They develop automatically through exposure to environ- mental triggers. It is conceivable that a human born with a deformed vocal tract develops a somewhat different set of processes than one born with a normal tract. Nevertheless, the vast majority of humans possess the same set of 'innate' processes because they all come to life with the same auditory and vocal equipment. Thus, they all have to suppress or modify the same set of processes to achieve mature pronunciation. Stampe called morphonological Rules 'learned' because they could only be acquired by observing phonemic alternations. What one 'learns' about Processes is how to prevent them from messing up desired pronunciations. One does not need to observe alternations in order to learn how to pronounce things correctly. You just try to say the words. I'm not sure whether this really contradicts what Martti said, but I am a little confused by all his references to 'norms'. I see nothing contradictory in describing linguistic systems from two points of view: social or psychological. I would tend to use terms like 'norm', 'cultural fact', 'institutional', etc., when talking about the role of language in society. I find it more difficult to use those terms when describing rules that control linguistic behavior. Natural Phonology is not a generative theory, but, like generativism, it is grounded in psychological function. Rick Wojcik (rwojcik
atc.boeing.com)
I agree to Eric Schillers recent posting on rules. I think that many of the problems he addressed (useful but defunct grammars etc.) have to do with the fact that progress in contemporary theoretical linguistics can be compared with progress in modern pop music. There is actually no progress in pop music but instead one fashionable tendency alternates with another (and what's here today may be gone tomorrow, good buy projection principle.) This wouldn't be a real problem for linguistics if all theories were equally good at describing the data, but unfortunately, the parallelism extends to the data as well. Moreover, it is often the case that linguists start to construct a set of fashionable data their theories can comply with. Tibor KissMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue