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Joe Stemberger <STEMBERGER%ELLVAXMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issuevx.acs.umn.edu> writes > . > . > . > > One last statement implicit in much work in linguistics: "I have no theory > of genetics, ontogeny, or evolutionary biology, but I'm sure that if I did, > modern linguistic assumptions about innateness would fit in real well." > > Maybe we should ask a bit more of ourselves that we often do. I agree, but would hasten to add, lest someone is left with the impression that theories of "genetics, ontogeny, or evolutionary biology" are somehow more correct than theories about the innateness of language, that researchers in those (and other) fields must also ask a bit more of themselves than they often do. More than likely all these theories are wrong in one way or another, and need to be revised, yet they are (more or less) consistent with the data available to us now - whatever led to the proposal that language is innate must be accounted for by these other theories also. Carl Alphonce Department of Computer Science (alphonce
cs.ubc.ca) University of British Columbia
The topic of the innateness of language has been coming up again lately in LINGUIST, with regard to rules and such. Debates on innateness are usually of the form: A: "There's no such thing." B: "Of course there is!" I'd like to hear a different aspect of innateness addressed. I've never understood why it makes any difference at all to linguistic theory whether highly language-specific information is innate or not. Yes, it makes a lot of difference for e.g. language acquisition, but that's beyond the scope of what most linguists do. It's not considered essential to study the acquisition of Warlpiri before you study the adult grammar, most linguists study only adult grammar, and the main principles of grammar have come from studies of adult grammar. (Have ANY of the main principles come from the study of acquisition? None in phonology, for sure.) Innateness is usually used as a explanation for universals, or for constraints on variation (parameters). But it has always seemed to me that what is important is that something is universal or that variation is limited to a few options. What possible difference TO LINGUISTIC THEORY could it make whether the observed patterns are due to language-specific innateness, or due to some more general feature of cognitive processing, or (for that matter) due to guidance from guardian angels or aliens from another dimension. The observed patterns are real under any explanation of where they come from, and languages seem to abide by them. We can still rule out some potential explanations because they might violate a universal, and still provide explanations where two phenomena are linked because they are due to the same parameter. So, why all this stuff about innateness? I've never understood why we care. Oh, yes, I DO understand why it's been posited. To paraphrase it in a completely uncharitable way (always useful for emphasizing that we are being kind to ourselves in the way we phrase it to ourselves), Chomsky reasoned in the following way: "Hmm. There are fundamental aspects of this theory that are based on some pretty weird data. The crucial sentences are always the sort of thing that no native speaker of a language would utter in natural speech, so no child would ever hear them; so no child could ever LEARN these aspects of grammar from input. So, the theory is unlearnable. Either (a) the theory is completely wrong (and the methodology that led me to it is worthless), or (b) it's not learned, but innate. OK, innateness is the only plausible answer." There are more charitable ways to phrase it, but that's the essence of it, and that's why so many non-linguists have trouble with it. (And linguists, too --- my graduate education at UCSD included expressions of extreme skepticism about innateness.) This seems to be one way to justify the idea that linguistic theory has any relevance to anything at all, GIVEN a judgment that it can't be learned. Personally, I think that people have been too hasty on that point; learnability work has not been grounded in human learning, but has attacked just the "logical problem" of learning, and some pretty weird assumptions are made. But, really, all that stuff is really beyond the scope of linguistic theory, and relates to how we might be viewed by psychologists, etc. Does innateness buy us anything FOR LINGUISTIC THEORY ITSELF? NOTE: I've tried to be as flippant as possible here, in order to be provocative. Please don't express displeasure with the tone of the comments. ---joe stembergerMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue