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NO INDIRECT SPEECH IN ANTIQUITY? " Several questions arise: (a) Should we attribute the lack or scarcity of indirectly reported speech in a language to grammar or to something else? (b) Are there languages in which we can establish that indirectly reported speech is impossible, so that a speaker is obliged to attribute actual words to a speaker?" One answer to this may be found in Julian Jayne's "The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind" in which indirect speech and the corresponding subjectivity (opaque contexts, etc.) is seen as a reflection of the newly invented subjectivity of consciousness. Newly invented that is, some several thousand years ago. Here are some passages that happen to be in front of me (second edition,1990 Houghton Mifflin). "The Greek subjective conscious mind, quite apart from its pseudostructure of soul, has been born out of song and poetry. From here it moves out into its own history, into the narratizing introspections of a Socrates and the spatialized classifications and analyses of an Aristotle, and from there into Hebrew, Alexandrian, and Roman thought. And then into history of a world which, because of it, will never be the same again.p.292...preceding consciousness there was a different mentality based on verbal hallucinations.p.452" NEedless to say, Jayne's ideas are controversial, making language play a fundamental role in the acquisition and operation of human consciousness. One implication is that it places the evolutionary changes in language many of us take for granted as intrinsic to human language extremely--I used to think unacceptably--recently in human history. This in turn has implications for theories of language acquisition, etc. etc. It will be of interest to see what LINGUIST viewers offer in reponse to b) above! John Limber, Psychology, University of New HampshireMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue