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Dick Hudson asks why the statistical asymmetry between S-V idioms (not common, apparently) and V-O ones (very common) should, as he says, "not count" as an argument for some kind of fundamental asymmetry between subjects and objects. I would say that there are two points here that need to be considered, which are not unrelated to each other. (1) There have been several different theories which have predicted, falsely as it turns out, that S-V idioms should be not merely infrequent but impossible, such as the apparently discredited theory that idioms have to be constituents. And it would certainly seem that Marantz and Chomsky, at least, formulate their theory of subject-object asymmetry in the same way. (2) The very fact that such idioms exist in well-known languages and yet were missed makes me somewhat hesitant to assume anything about the possible significance of the rarity of these examples. Maybe there are a lot more, or maybe there are few in English but lots in some other languages with otherwise rather similar syntactic structures. There are lots of apparent anomalies when it comes to the frequency of different types of idioms. For example, why should there be (apparently) so many more idioms like 'The jury is out on X', where the idiom consists of the subject + the verb + a piece but less than the whole of the VP than there are of the form subject + verb? Or why should there be so many idioms involving less than the whole subject phrase (with a nonidiomatic possessor, that is) than there are involving the whole subject phrase? In fact, historically, the whole thing is quite weird, because there are types of idioms which were once claimed to be equally impossible (like 'The jury is out on X'), but nowadays it seems that no one is interested in how frequent they are. Actually, they are (apparently) not all that frequent, but since they are no longer considered crucial to the issue of subject/object asymmetry or of the VP, no one seems to care. So, it seems to me that there is a pattern here: First of all, for too long the facts have been used simply as a way of arguing for or against some theory which itself has little to do with idioms and which does not in general help explain anything about them. Second, as examples which were once thought impossible are uncovered, after a suitable period of trying to minimize their significance or to deny their reality, we simply come up with a new theory (which no longer predicts them to be impossible, but which does not explain why they were sufficiently rare so that for a long time everyone agreed they did not exist at all, and which, ipso facto, does not explain anything about the statistical distribution of different idiom types). Why should the sole role of idioms in linguistic theory be as "arguments" or "tests" for theories about constituent structure and such?Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue