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While we're on the subjects of conventionalized irony and spurious negation, here's a mystery to chew on. One day on the freeway, while swerving to avoid an unexpected lane entrant, I found myself muttering: (1) I love people who signal. (1) was clearly intended as ironic, but I noticed that it was also true (given, perhaps, a certain hyperbolic sense of 'love'), which is not a normal characteristic of ironic utterances. It occurred to me that this odd dual status seemed to have come about because both verbs in the sentence were being negated as a form of conventional irony. Running through the obvious alternatives, I produced: (2) I love people who don't signal. [false & ironic] (3) I hate people who don't signal. [true & literal] (4) #I hate people who signal. [not ironic] Of these, (2) is a more common ironic form, identical to (1) in intended sense (though logically different, and false), (3) is a literally true statement which is not ironic, and (4) is rather odd in this context; the most I can say about it is that it's not ironic, or at least not conventionally so. What seems to be happening is that in this sentence, for whatever reason, one can express irony in two ways; (a) by conventionally negating the main predicate (i.e, substituting 'love' for 'hate'), thus misdescribing the subject's feelings ironically; and (b) by conventionally negating the relative clause that characterizes the object [people who (don't) signal], thus misdescribing the object ironically. What's interesting is that this seems to have to be a top-down affair. If you do (a) upstairs, you can optionally do (b) downstairs as well, possibly for further ironic effect (though my ironimeter isn't calibrated for comparisions this fine), and incidentally producing a literally true sentence, since the double negations cancel out in this construction. But if you do don't do (a) upstairs, you can't do (b) downstairs; attempting this produces (4), which is odd. This seems similar (though I would hesitate to claim identical) to the phenomenon of "secondary triggering" of NPI's, (i.e, A weak negative trigger like 'surprised' can trigger an NPI like 'any', but not (to use Ross's term) a "neg-needy" one like 'in weeks': (5)a I don't think anybody's been here. b I'm surprised anybody's been here. (6)a I don't think he's been here in weeks. b *I'm surprised he's been here in weeks. However, triggering 'any' downstairs in (6)a licenses "secondary triggering" of 'in weeks' there as well: (6)c I'm surprised anybody's been here in weeks. ...all of which no doubt goes to show that this is a more complex situation than a metaphor like "triggering" can really deal with.) Does anybody's theory of either negation or irony predict any of this? -John Lawler <jlawlerMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueumich.edu> Program in Linguistics University of Michigan