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In reply to Jacques Guy: Unfortunately, it is difficult to look up an unpublished paper, which, therefore, can hardly be used as an evidence for the total dismissal of the idea of the basic vocabulary. It is certainly true that many items in both Swadesh's lists are not universal: there will be hardly a word for "snake" in Eskimo or the word for "ice" in Hawaiian. Nevertheless, both Eskimos and Hawaiians DRINK WATER, HEAR with their EARS, SEE with their EYES, and cook their food on FIRE. Should I continue? There are cases when there may be two words for water in a language, the known cases for me being Hopi and Ainu, first differentiating between contained water and water in nature, and the second between drinkable and undrinkable water. It is possible to imagine a language which would have sepa- rate words for a left and a right eye (though I do not know one), but such cases are not by any means universal, and they are not an obstacle for appli- cation of the comparative method, since even under these circumstances we never have ten different words for "eye". Therefore, I think that it is possible to come up with a list of basic vocabulary, which may undergo certain modifications, but its core will remain. An interesting attempt of this kind is A. Dolgopol'skii's list of 15 items, all of which, I believe are pretty basic. Sincerely, Alexander Vovin Miami UniversityMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
If `object pronouns' are just inflections, why is it that they are treated like separate object NPs by the rule that makes a past participle agree with its object provided the latter precedes it? (1) Je l'ai e'crite (la lettre). I it have written (the letter) (2) La lettre que j'ai e'crite ... the letter that I have written (fem sing) (3) J'ai e'crit_ la lettre. I have written the letter I agree with Auger and Miller that genuine inflectional morphology should be invisible to syntax, contrary to much GB practice, but clitics do seem to have a genuine intermediate status as units which are part of syntactic structure but which are also treated like parts of other words (e.g. for what I imagine is an uncontroversial example, take "'re" in "We're ready"). Dick Hudson Dept of Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT uclyrahMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueucl.ac.uk
I've been thinking about Joe Stemberger's posting about analogy, and fully agree with him that the example he cites is not a good one at all. But I think there is a more important point to make, that is, that analogy is not about prediction and therefore the failure of something to be grammatical is not a failure of any theory of analogy. J. Kurylowicz, in his "La nature des proces dits analogiques" (Lingua 1945-49), uses a frequently quoted image of weather: we can have sewers, downspouts, gutters, and so on, but if it doesn't rain, they don't function. And, we cannot predict when it will rain. I would also suggest that Joe's characterization of analogy functioning when two linguistic units share, to a degree, both form and meaning is perhaps an exaggeration of initial similarity. There can be sharings of meaning without form (so that `went' gets changed by analogy to weak verbs to `goed' by children at a certain stage of acquisition where the pair `go' `went' share a high degree of meaning but no form at all) and form without meaning (folk etymologies of all kinds). As an aside to Joe's aside, `I saw the barn red' can also be said by an artist explaining her mental conception of the barn which caused her to paint it (on canvas or as a building) red.Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Why don't we forget about all this hoity-toity Latinate and Grecian terminology, and just call ourselves TONGUESTERS?Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue