LINGUIST List 5.1338

Mon 21 Nov 1994

Sum: Hearer's implicature/implication-interpretation process

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1. (, Summary: in other words

Dear Netters,
 I have posted several queries a few months ago. About ten members
of the Linguist List answered me by e-mails. I must show great thanks
especially to Prof. Welchsler, Prof. Jewett, Prof. Edwards(who sent me
examples of IOW from London-Lund Corpus), Prof. Patrikis, Prof. Spackman,
Prof. Macrakis, Prof. Alvarez-Caccamo, Prof. Harris, Prof. Huettner, and
Dr. Georgia Green(who introduced me "Two types of convention in indirect
speech acts" by J. L. Morgan, contained in the volume: _Syntax and
Semantics, vol. 9: Pragmatics_ edited by Peter Cole (1978, New York:
Academic Press). The following are my own summary.

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 In this summary, I propose the hearer's implicature/implication-
interpretation process(Prof. Alvarez-Caccamo's suggestion), which
constrains on the use of in other words(IOW) in English. I would
distinguish between speaker's intended implicature and hearer's
interpreted implicature. Thus, Speaker A may have the intention to
implicate X, but Hearer B may very well fail to recognize such impli-
cature or else may interpret some other. Even if B correctly interprets
A's intention, B's interpretation depends largely upon the context and
/or background assumption. The use of IOW is such a case. A dictionary
edited by Ball (1986) calls such usage "inferential function", though he
uses the term rather informally in the dictionary. I will follow his
terminology just for the sake of convenience.
 The inferential use of IOW frequently occurs between the two people's
dialogue.
 (1) A: I'm afraid there isn't much I can help you with.
 B: _In other words_, you don't want to be bothered.
Although the interpretation process of (1) is very close to what is
called "conventional" use, i.e. it might be processed spontaneously,
without any inferential process in the hearer's mind, B guesses A's real
intent, which is not directly inferred from A's utterance, but indirect-
ly from A's implicature. In order for B to necessitate IOW, B exploits
his/her background assumption/encyclopedic knowledge, implicating that A
is busy now, or A doesn't feel at ease with B. Let the implicature just
explained be C, then a sequential flow of consciousness/inferential
process such as A $"* (JC $"* (JB emerges. IOW is a visible index of the
 hearer's
implicature-interpretation process.
 Speaker/hearer's background assumption varies between common sense
and the knowledge which is only valid between the speaker and hearer.
 (2) A: I love Schubert's late piano sonatas.
 B: _In other words_, you don't like the Beethoven sonatas?
IOW in (2B) is derived by the use of a restricted set of background
assumption in which B has already admired the Beethoven sonatas. B
assumes that A is also an admirer of Beethoven, but contrary to B's
assumption A declares an admiration for Schubert. So, B feels criticism
in A's words. B's background assumption becomes an old information,
conflates A's new information and enables IOW to create A=B.
 "Non-conventional", rather complicated use of IOW is the following.
 (3) A: I'm going to kill you.
 B: _In other words_, you'd like it if I moved my car.
For example, B's car stands in the way of A's car, so that A gets
infuriated at B. The situation like the above gets A to utter such harsh
words; kill you. A's real intent, in this case implicature/implication,
is "I'm going to kill you if you don't move your car", or simply "Move
your car", which is labelled as C again. B, beginning with IOW,
paraphrases C by B's own words. Again in order for B to use IOW, h/she
must infer that A assumes/implicates C. Background assumption mitigates
B's processing effort. If not, B processes too much effort and cannot
interpret A's words. B's job here is to process the flow of the
dialogue like A $"* (JC $!a (JB.
 B's failure to process/infer the flow of the dialogue sometimes
occurs.
 (1') A: I'm afraid there isn't much I can help you with.
 B': ?_In other words_, you need to be helped.
In the context where A really needs help, s/he doesn't bother to say
that s/he can't help B'. If A's hands are full of the parcels and he
visibly needs help, so that s/he says s/he can't help B', there is a
possibility of B' saying it is you who need to be helped. However, this
is a very insulting comment, because B' actually implies that if you
can't help me, you are not a capable person. So, you are the one who
needs help.
 Another completely misled example of inference is the following.
 (4) A: Sorry, I can't help you now, because I'm busy.
 B: *_In other words_, you're busy.
Unacceptability of B comes from A's words _because I'm busy_, where A
has already spoken out his own implicature C. Mere repetition cannot be
allowed in IOW's case. If something extra can be implied in B's response,
type of (4) is OK.
 (5) A: Sorry, I can't help you now.
 B: _In other words_, you can't. (-)'you really can't.')
 In summary, an utterance "A. In other words, B" has an inferential
process/hearer's interpretive process "A $"* (JC; in other words C $!a (JB".

 IOW can be campared with 'so' and 'then,' etc. The following results
are the above contributors' reactions. (*) means that there are some who
judge a sentence acceptable and others unacceptable.
'So':
 $!! (J(6) a. There was $5 in his wallet. {_So_ / (*)_In other words_} he
 hadn't spent all the money.
 b. She's your teacher. {_So_ / (*)_In other words_} you must
 respect her.
 $!! (J(7) Playing the French horn.
 A: Anyway, the horn makes funny noises. {_So_ / (*)_In other words
 _} it's a treacherous instrument, isn't it? It's something that
 is very hard for you to control. Why is that? Too much spit, or
 what?
 B: I'm glad you've used that term. Because it's not difficult. It
 is treacherous. So are the players, of course. But that's
 another story.
 $!! (J(8) Tom ate condemned meat. {_So_ / *_In other words_} he felt ill.
 $!! (J(9) Bill insulted Mary. {_So_ / _In other words_} she left.
In contrast with resultative 'so's' in (6) and (7), Two 'so's' in (8)
and (9) are sequential. In the case of IOW, one is OK and the other is
out. (9) can be interpreted that BIll's insulting Mary always leads to
her leaving (here), so that IOW is permitted. IOW in (8) isn't OK
because eating condemned meat always equals to his feeling ill, in which
case IOW in such situation is redundant/meaningless/uninformative.
'Then':
 $!! (J(10) An insurance man visits a girl he knows. He has brought her a
 policy application for signature. They talked about her husband.
Girl: I'm expecting Robert home soon.
Insurance Salesman: Oh! Why? Is he in trouble?
G: No. He's thinking of setting up in business on his own.
IS: Oh, good for him.
G: You think it's a good idea?
IS: Yes, why not?
G: Small businesses are going bust all over the place.
IS: So, there are millions of people on the dole right now who
thought they were safe and secure working for someone else. {_So_
/ _In other words_ / (*)_Then_}, now's the time to have a go.
There's nothing else to lose anyway.
G: Think so?
IS: Yes.
'In that case':
 $!! (J(11) A: I'm afraid there isn't much I can help you with.
 B: {_In that case_ / (*)_In other words_} I shall have to ask
 someone else.
'That is':
 $!! (J(12) They took refreshments, {_that is_ / *_in other words_}, sand-
 witches, coffee, beer, fruit juice, and chocolate.
Ball (1986) explains that 'that is' is open-ended and IOW is closed-
ended.
************************************************************************
 If you have further comments on my analyisis of IOW above, please
don't hesitate to e-mail me.

Thanks very much for all the help you have given.

Sincerely,
Hiroaki Tanaka
Associate Professor, Tokushima University, Japan.
e-mail: GCA01363niftyserve.or.jp