Editor for this issue: <>
These are notes after the recent discussions of Karl Teeter, AMRamer, Sally Thomason, after the AAA meetings sessions on distant language reconstructions, and also in response to part of Mr. Poser's message of 14 December. First, most of the discussion of Karl Teeter I can agree with wholeheartedly except in the use of any of his criteria as absolutes. Even grammatical things can be borrowed (as Sally pointed out). People do in practice ***correctly*** accept a language family such as Uto-Aztecan as essentially proven, even when no grammar has been written for the proto-language, or when only parts of a grammar are written. On the one hand, nobody would be disturbed much if it turned out that one of the assumed Uto-Aztecan languages was originally from another family, with truly massive borrowing from Uto-Aztecan. The overall hypothesis of a Uto-Aztecan family would not be shaken. On the other hand, asking the question how much of the grammar of the proto-language has to be written reveals the non-absoluteness of the criterion. Only a tiny bit? That might be subject to one of the special cases in which some morphology and other grammar were borrowed (Sally's general type of example). So, again, Karl is right in general, but wrong if any single criterion is taken as an absolute (unless circularly many criteria are combined by feats of legalese into a single criterion). I would like to modify AMRamer's statement in exactly the same spirit: )we canNOT demand a detailed morphological reconstruction )UNTIL the languages are accepted as related. This is too strong. It is not quite the same as Ramer's )But surely he does not mean that a comparative grammar is a )prerequisite to a reconstruction; it is PART of a reconstruction. In practice, an extensive comparative grammar is indeed written as part of a reconstruction (Ramer's second wording above, not his first above), but it is not likely to be written unless ***BOTH*** of the following two conditions are fulfilled: 1) The languages are in fact related (makes the grammar easier to write) 2) Enough scholars believe that the languages might be related and so put effort into establishing their links. It is some unwarranted discouragement of the second which needs to be dealt with in our field. Ramer is right that some linguists do discourage attempts to prove what has not already been proven. No risk-taking, in other words. Good researchers, attempting to write a grammar of Altaic for example, will report all of their results, both for genetic relatedness, for borrowing, and for a host of other questions they will not even have thought of when they started their research. Some researchers evaluate only the hypothesis they started with. Very often the differences of viewpoint amount to nothing more than an elevation of what one does oneself into the "true" or "real" work of the field, instead of recognizing that it takes a number of different contributions. I will illustrate from Karl Teeter's recent messages, with no malice intended, because I am absolutely sure he intends none himself. In modifying his wording to take account of AMRamer's point that of course people do properly classify languages on the basis of phonological correspondences, Teeter writes on 10 December: "since it is clear that everybody's first approximation to linguistic history begins with such classification. What I say is just that you cannot RECONSTRUCT languages on this basis." (Please note the words "first approximation" in this. That you cannot reconstruct languages on the bases of classification alone seems to me a tautology.) Later in the same message, Teeter reverts to the more absolute statement: "On the contrary, my contention (not my invention), is that the only way to establish that languages are related is to write a grammar of the proto- langauge and show how it developed into different later grammars." (Please note the words "the only way" and "establish". Using these words does not change the fact that Uto-Aztecan is ***correctly*** accepted as a proven family without Teeter's criteria being satisfied.) On 8 December, Teeter wrote: )"Systematic correspondences of sounds in the vocabularies" may prove )a connection between languages, which is certainly an interesting )first step, but there the real work of comparative grammar starts: [Then Teeter mentions four possible explanations, only one genetic] )Until one can exclude the first three factors, one has proven )nothing at all regarding genetic relationship. Teeter discounts the enormous work of discovering likely language families in the first place, trivializes that as not the "real work" and establishment of systematic sound correspondences as proving "nothing at all" regarding genetic relationship. On the contrary, that does prove a grouping as a legitimate candidate for genetic relationship, and often the nature of the sound correspondences found will also have made one or more of the alternatives less probable. The work of comparative-historical grammarians is "real work". So is the work of those who spend enormous hard-working hours sifting potential cognates to discover potential sound correspondences. Do Teeter and others really have no knowledge of how much work that takes? At no stage is something ever completely proven in an absolute sense (not even after a comparative grammar is written, because of the potential for undiscovered problems of the kind noted by Sally Thomas). All stages of the process contribute to the end result. All stages are equally "the real work". Proof is always incremental, not nothing, not complete and absolute. ******************************************** I turn next to Mr. Poser's message, and to other information gleaned at the AAA meetings. Perhaps Mr. Poser will be surprised that I am enthusiastically in favor of anyone correcting any errors in any claims of language relationship or language structure, including Mr. Poser's mention of Kimball correcting errors in Muskogean, even or especially if that means that a Greenberg claim about pronouns in Amerind is weakened. It is actually claims about morphology where I expect Greenberg is least likely to have succeeded in contributing something. I thank Mr. Poser for the bibliography I can check against my lists of corrections and for this note on Muskogean pronouns. I also agree with Mr. Poser that the criticism of errors in data does not rely on the mere authority of the critic. (That was not my point about appeals to authority, so one of Mr. Poser's paragraphs was not directly relevant. My earlier point about appeals to authority remains.) I did not indicate (as Mr. Poser's message suggests) that critics complained of errors when they could not back them up. What I did say was that they claimed Greenberg's errors made the method worthless, without bothering to test whether correction of the errors would actually lead to a change in his conclusions, and without promptly providing the data so others could carry out such a test. )From conversations, I would judge some are still reluctant to face this test, the one required by a part of their claims. (Even if their claims on this point prove wrong in some degree, because the conclusions of Greenberg's method mostly remain the same even after errors of those kinds are corrected, it still will not follow that Greenberg's methods produce valid results on a regular basis. Please notice how careful it is important to be with notions of proof for or against anything.) In conversation with Bob Rankin at the recent AAA meetings I indicated I was glad Greenberg had made the attempt at morphology, with his 3rd-person alternation between /y/ and /t/ as a putative relic irregularity, but I was equally likely to end up believing that he had discovered a new typological fact, a preference for these unmarked segments and recurring conditions under which they might alternate in more or less the same way, which might indicate that the same phenomenon could arise by chance repeatedly. We are always dealing simultaneously with possibilities of genetic relationship or convergent evolution. As a general warning about the danger of throwing out hypotheses too early because they are "obviously" cases of chance lookalikes or convergent evolution, an article "Common pathways of illumination" by Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard, in Natural History magazine, December 1994 pp.10-20, discusses the origins of eyes in different phyla of the animal kingdom. He states that this had been a classic case in biology, used to show convergent evolution of originally unrelated organs to serve the same function. However, the DNA specialists have gotten their hands on this one, and apparently it is ***the SAME DNA*** which is regulating important parts of the production of eyes in these various phyla, barring of course a few changes in a few amino acid codes. This DNA is therefore genetically inherited (and we are talking as far back as the common node on the family tree of Drosophila fruit flies, Squids, and Humans!). If this line of argument holds up, we have quite a revolution in thinking on our hands. (Such thinking can of course go far overboard too.) "Chance lookalikes" certainly do exist massively. Sound symbolism is a typological basis for their recurrence. The too-easy use of "chance lookalikes" to reject comparisons can however also be just like the too-easy use of "substrate" and many other ways of purporting to explain phenomena, but in reality merely naming them without doing the hard work of really explaining them. As another factual contribution to the discussion of Greenberg's errors, Bob Rankin clarified for me at the AAA meetings that he had looked at Greenberg's original notebooks, and that apparently what happened is that Greenberg had a single flexible flap in his notebook bearing the language names, and sheets which he matched up against that to enter data for particular lexical items. This is a mechanism subject to errors of the two pieces of paper slipping vertically relative to each other, and in fact there were rather a large number of such errors. It was errors of rows rather than of columns (as I loosely had assumed without ever bothering to ask if rows or columns). Mr. Poser originally asked on 9th November whether "limitations [of the comparative method] had been and were being used to justify resistance to proposals of emote relationships..." Please take careful note of this wording, as Mr. Poser changed the wording in his message of 14 December, when he asserts no example has been given. I gave Mr. Poser an eyewitness account satisfying the wording he used. I stand by that eyewitness account. (I do not like naming names ever in these matters, but Mr. Poser's assertion could be answered only by an eyewitness account.) None of Mr. Poser's supposed rebuttal in his recent message is at all relevant to that claim, though it is relevant to another claim, an absurd one, that I did not make. (As in his previous message, Mr. Poser mixes several different wordings of what are quite radically different hypotheses. Any extended discussion of these variants would not be relevant to any of our central points, so I omit them.) To be specific about that absurd claim I did *not* make, I quite agree with Mr. Poser that some of the same people also criticize Greenberg's hypotheses based on the factual data. I have never denied that, and in fact took pains to refer to other good work by the same people, and have always emphasized the importance of having corrections of data. Mr. Poser's conclusion was: )It thus appears, as I thought, that there are no real examples of perceived )limitations of the comparative method being used as the basis for rejecting )proposals of genetic affiliation. Since I gave an eyewitness account of such an example of the perceived limitations being used as ONE basis for rejecting proposals of genetic affiliation, Mr. Poser can only maintain his original assertion by converting it into a different assertion as he has here, namely that there is no case of a person using those perceived limitations as "the" (read "the only") basis for rejecting such proposals. I will simply repeat that in the case to which I was eyewitness, the tone of the presentation was quite clear that the absurdity of the time depth was sufficient ***in and of itself*** to rule out the legitimacy of attempting such distant comparison. (A critique of errors in Greenberg's data is not directly relevant to this point, even if engaged in by the same person.) Apparently Mr. Poser wants his allies to be persons who not only do good work, but also do nothing wrong. But we cannot posit such a division between the "holy" and the "unclean", like the caste distinctions of traditional India. No one has the right to take such a position vis a vis other good-faith researchers, however much they may disagree with data, results, or methods. I gather from some conversations at the AAA that some of the people involved have become more moderate since the earlier years in these matters, at least in their public statements. That is certainly all to the good. There are also small beginnings of developments of method which may turn out to be relevant to our current limitations. I am perplexed by Mr. Poser's discussion of the supposed rule of using only three-consonant matches never merely two-consonant matches. Although I used Siouxan-Yuchi, because some Amerindianists are considering this, the point does not depend in the slightest on whether one believes these two particular nodes are related or not. Perhaps someone can propose another alternative (I would suggest looking for one in Tibeto-Burman, where perhaps only one consonant, one vowel, and tone would be available, and yet the genetic relations are in some cases secure.) I agree with Mr. Poser that it is better to have three consonants than two, and precisely because it helps to avoid chance resemblances. As I stated in the previous message. That means that the only difference between us is that Mr. Poser will consider treating the preferred method (3 consonants) as the only permitted one: )If (probably contrary to fact), matches of three consonants are )necessary to exclude chance, ... I do not see why we should be )unwilling, in that case, to conclude either that they are not )related or that, if they are, the relationship is not demonstrable. The problem here is the notion that such a particular rule *could even conceivably* be "necessary to exclude chance". No rule is necessary to exclude chance. A large number of procedures and methods can ***help*** to exclude chance. Except in the most difficult cases of all, probably most single rules can be violated, and there will still be enough other ways of excluding chance that a good result can be achieved. It is this fossilization in the response to expansions of the methods available as part of "The Comparative Method" which is damaging to increasing the rigor as well as the power of our field. It is encouraging to see sessions on distant language relationships. I firmly believe some of these sessions would not be occurring nor would there be so much work on studying methods, if Greenberg had not published that book. Some of the growth of interdisciplinary cooperation and communication was also in the process of happening anyway, and Greenberg just accidentally published at this time. (I am not trying to credit him with causing all of this interest.) I particularly liked John Colarusso's contribution to the Eurasian session, because he outlined his views on why distant language comparisons are very difficult because of the progressive loss of data, yet he is not in the business of criticizing people who attempt these. He is in the business of himself contributing to a deepening of both linguistic and mythological comparisons as much as he can in areas which are still to a great extent uncharted. Johanna Nichols also provoked much thought with her methods, and ways of integrating more information on peripheries vs. centers of innovation and residue of repeated waves of innovation visible even at the peripheries, as a pattern to look for in projecting a homeland backwards in time. I am somewhat skeptical about very distant language comparisons which involve only identities of sound correspondence, precisely because it is so easy for this approach to select a very old but still relatively more recent layer of borrowings (more recent than the node on the family tree we may be struggling to find a way to reach). As Greenberg pointed out, an increase in the number of conditioning contexts over time, once it approaches the number of lexical items available for comparison, leads to the result that there are virtually no recurrences of exactly the same sound correspondences. Please see a separate message on how we can sharpen our tools to deal with this, titled "Typology of Historical Change". This means that I start out somewhat skeptical about Alan Bomhard's Nostratic and similar comparisons, precisely because he uses only or preferentially sound correspondences of identity. But that may be my personal bias, and I may end up granting that such a strictness of sound correspondences can actually work over great time depths. I cannot presume to know. There was one session I did not attend but report here from the abstract, in which researchers reported results of mitochondrial DNA studies of the various Native American populations. As expected, Eskimo and Athabaskan were separable (one variety each?). The remainder of Native American populations shared four varieties of mitochondrial DNA, either without subgrouping, or perhaps in two major subgroups. Bob Rankin did attend and says that the authors in their presentation had come down on the side of two major subgroups. Population genetics need not match language directly, but the data is still at least interesting and obliquely relevant... Lloyd AndersonMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue