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In LINGUIST 5.1452, Alex Housen summarized responses from a number of correspondents, including me, by saying: )Two general themes emerged from these responses: )1. As far as theory-building is concerned, the main areas of interest and )development for the future are believed to lie in the field of cognitive )linguistics, i.e. the relation of linguistic structure to cognition as )envisaged by R Langacker, G Lakoff, and others. )2. In terms of methodology, a stronger emphasis on corpus based )research, made possible by the ongoing micro-electronic revolution. The )increasing application of computers in linguistic research is expected to )bring about some major theoretical revolutions/paradigm shifts (cf. PDP, )connectionism). What I sent Housen was a slightly edited version of the introduction to a sort of review document that the Penn Linguistics department produced, at the request of our administration, a couple of years ago. This document is too long to burden the readers of LINGUIST with. However, I would like to observe that it does not actually support Housen's conclusions, which are his own; I disagree with them, and I believe that my colleagues in the department here do as well. Our review began Looking first within linguistics itself, we will identify nine subdisciplines that are useful in discussing our program, and briefly consider the intellectual trends within each of them. Following this, we will discuss two strong current national trends that involve cross-disciplinary research. The bulk of the review was thus devoted to trends within areas such as pragmatics, syntax, phonology, historical linguistics, etc.; within each area, we discussed theoretical trends and our own program's outlook. At the end, we added a discussion of two factors that cut across traditional subdisciplinary boundaries: the rise of the work that goes under the name of Cognitive Science, and the trend towards computer-assisted study of large databases of text and speech to provide broader empirical grounding. I am afraid that our discussion of these points may have misled Housen. With respect to the first point, there is an unfortunate confusion of nomenclature. "Cognitive Science," as represented by the NSF Science and Technology Center in cognitive science here at Penn, or the cognitive science programs in quite a few other universities, is not at all the same as "Cognitive Linguistics." With respect to the second point, I do not believe that the rise of corpus-based research is leading towards connectionism; it simply provides a valuable and increasingly convenient source of empirical evidence for linguistic research of whatever kind. Let me offer one concrete example that makes both points. Lila Gleitman (co-director of the Institute for Cognitive Science here at Penn) and I are editing a multi-author volume intended for use in undergraduate courses in cognitive science. One of its chapters, by Steven Pinker, reviews a wide range of empirically-grounded studies of children's acquisition of English past tense morphology, and offers a carefully-reasoned argument against connectionist (i.e. analogical) accounts of children's error patterns, and in favor of a (mainly) rule-based account. This chapter is an excellent example of cognitive science, in my opinion, although it has nothing to do with "cognitive linguistics," and indeed seems contrary to some of the important themes of "cognitive linguistics" as I understand them. The research that Pinker surveys is corpus-based---indeed the documentation for the CHILDES corpus is in the "suggestions for further reading"---but he specifically argues for the empirical inadequacy of connectionist models of the phenomena he treats. Mark Liberman mylMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueunagi.cis.upenn.edu University of Pennsylvania
I didn't summon the energy to reply to you r first query, but given what looks like a somewhat unbalanced pair of conclusions, I am adding some not unbiassed comments of my own. Theory: Where theory ought to be going, and has been, slowly, is towards a reconciliation between different theories. It is anomolous in a scientific discipline for there to be rival theories on such a scale as there are in syntax, for instance. The other necessary reconciliation is between syntax and various forms of semantics: formal semantics both lexical and compositional, so-called cognitive semantics, and the sort of inferential semantics needed for pragmatics. I doubt whether any reconciliation between computional methods based on probabilistic or PDP style methods, and formal theory, is possible yet, but it has to happen one day. Corpus-based work is a necessary preliminary to this, as is a good computational pragmatics. Corpus based work should also provide useful input to construction of a serious representation of the mental lexicon. Most theories put more emphasis on the lexicon than a decade ago. However, I feel strongly that more theoretical work on the syntax/semantic interface is needed. We also need more work on parametric differences between languages in relation to the lexicon, and need to take account of theories of mind from other disciplines, and from psycholinguistics itself. Work on a large variety of languages will and must continue to inform theory (and challenge computatonal modelling). Annabel Cormack.Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue