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Good reviews are difficult to get in a polarized field. I would love to be working in a field which was a mixture of enthusiasm of discovery and carefulness in handling data. Without all the blasted politics. Not to take any position at all on the recent controversy concerning a review of Illyc-Svityc's Nostratic work in *Language* but to point out the difficulty of getting reviews in a polarized field, the first review of Greenberg's Language in the Americas by Campbell, omitted to treat the chapter on detailed analysis of method in statistics of vocabulary comparisons at different time depths, thereby to my mind illegitimately giving the impression that Greenberg was naive and had not considered this. (Completely separate from whether Greenberg's considerations on techniques are valid, I of course suspect some are, some are not.) Sally Thomason was able to get a second review, from Matisoff. This one used the term "megalolinguistics", from which the invited inference is obvious to anyone native to the English language: "megalomania". This is ad hominem, and inappropriate to a scholarly journal. What can one do in such a climate? We have still not had a review by someone who is actually interested in all possible outcomes of the investigation, without any axe to grind, correcting errors, estimating how much influence that would have on the conclusions, etc. etc. It may be that it will be a long time before we can really get such an evaluation, simply because as a field we do not yet have enough information on how various measures of potential relatedness we may use are actually affected by increases in time depth etc. For those who wish to contribute to our increase in knowledge in this sphere, hence our ability to even attempt an objective evaluation of such hypotheses and techniques as Greenberg's, I posted earlier the main outlines of at least one plan of investigation, namely, making explicit rather than implicit the "typology of historical changes" in semantics, phonetics, etc. I would love to gradually develop a growing core consensus, of people and of techniques (I use "techniques" rather than "methods" because "techniques" is positive and lacks the overtones of religious purity often attached to "proper method") of people who, without knowing in advance the conclusions to be drawn, at least agree that all or most of a list of possible investigations would contribute to our techniques and ability to evaluate claims of deep or distant relationships. The "typologies of historical changes" which are my own personal interest and where I have had something to contribute can of necessity be only one part of those. Lloyd AndersonMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Indo-European as the prime model for comparative-historical linguistics? Certainly insofar as techniques have been developed there, and there are older written documents helping to verify the results of those techniques. However, as pointed out by others, the particular structure of Indo-European languages must not be permitted to bias our historical techniques against languages with different kinds of structure. I'd like to see more respect and more modesty in all directions on this issue. Lloyd AndersonMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
The initial replies to Geoffrey Pullum quite properly said that the question might be misplaced and not really be about what it seemed to be about: What counts as the true null hypothesis? Multiple variables so nothing can be definitively disproven (or I would add, proven); Turning the discussion to how people in the past have actually changed their views, as separating Tai from Sino-Tibetan. Let me instead give some indications of what does and does not for me count as evidence against some particular claims. I am being very precise in my wording here, using "count as evidence against" rather than "disprove" because it is a fallacy to believe that evidence "disproves" or "proves" hypotheses directly. That would be contrary to everything we know about the history of real science, as opposed to abstracted philosophy of science. First an example which does not at first hearing seem to me to be highly relevant or a strong argument, then one which might be more relevant. Bob Rankin mentioned to me at the AAA an as-yet-unpublished paper by Lyle Campbell from the Colorado conference, in which Rankin says Lyle showed that taking Uralic and Amerind, that Greenberg's method would subgroup part of Uralic with part of Amerind. (I have no independent knowledge of Lyle's paper besides this comment from Rankin.) That seems counterintuitive, though not all connections across the Pacific of that kind must necessarily be counterintuitive. Indeed, if we believe in multiple migrations and had infinitely powerful tools to discover true language families, we should expect to perhaps find multiple connections of different parts of Amerind. There are three considerations which make this not particularly relevant to me. 1) As in statistics, if the assumptions of the technique are violated, the results of using a technique may be less than useful. Greenberg's technique assumes (and does not try to prove) that all of the languages under examination are in fact related at some level. The only conclusions from his method are subgroupings, i.e. splits, not groupings, i.e. assertions of relatedness. That is, ***if*** all of these are related, then group A are more closely related within themselves than they are with B. 2) I assume (perhaps wrongly, by the way), that the distance between Uralic and Amerind (if indeed it is a single group) is of such an order of magnitude greater than distances within Amerind, that assuming they are related is tantamount to a violation of the assumption behind the technique. In other words, Greenberg's technique like any other must have time limits reducing its effectiveness past certain depths. I am assuming only that there are techniques (Greenberg's, improved upon and with fewer errors, might be one or might not be) which can go deeper than the traditional techniques of the comparative method as practiced in the past. It is our goal to increase the power of our techniques, after all. 3) I know that Campbell is so intent on discrediting Greenberg that his review in Language improperly failed to really recognize even the existence of a major chapter of Greenberg's book, that part dealing with analysis of rates of change and other techniques in long distance comparison rather than with the particulars of Amerind. So I cannot trust his conclusions, but would have to go over the data of the Uralic and Amerind languages myself to see whether Campbell had, knowingly or not, selected data to discredit Greenberg. Now I turn to an example which may count as evidence against Greenberg's hypothesis. The findings of the DNA analysis reported at this past AAA, again according to Rankin who attended, came down firmly on the side of there being two subgroups within Amerind (aside from the Eskimo and the Athabaskans). If Greenberg's method fails to find these two major subgroups, that is for me more relevant to arguing against Greenberg than the report I have of Campbell's paper, because it is presumably on a lesser time depth, and either Greenberg's method or his assumption that Amerind are all related at a time depth his techniques can handle must be wrong. Of course that is also assuming that to the degree relevant for this discussion, the genetic groupings do match the true language family groupings, which as we know need not be the case because of language shift. I say this merely for completeness, because I can simultaneously say that such a finding (if it does not match Greenberg's subdivisions within Amerind) does for me count as evidence against, and also say that like any evidence it cannot ***by itself*** disprove Greenberg's hypotheses. Since I have as yet no reason to suspect the authors of the DNA paper as having an axe to grind about Amerind linguistics, that is also one reason I will tend to treat this argument as more telling. I do not yet even know what the two- part division of Amerind was that the DNA analysis suggested! Does Geoffrey Pullum really propose that the null hypothesis should be that Muskogean is not related to anything else in Amerind? Perhaps I am misreading his words. I find such a suggestion extremely implausible, and my null hypothesis would be the reverse, assuming it was related to something in the Americas but without specifying what. However, when faced by the claim that Muskogean is most closely related to some particular Amerindian family, I would take the null hypothesis to be "not related". Lloyd AndersonMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Readers would do well to compare Larry Trask's message on errors made by outsiders (and why only specialists should be allowed to engage in comparison) [but of course they often refuse to engage in it] with Benji Wald's discussion a couple of days ago of the attitudes to the Greenberg reclassification of African languages. It was the well entrenched prestigious elites that resisted the longest, according to Wald's summary if I understood him. That is typical in all history of science. I do not see why it is any differnt here. It is also the case that elites resist things that are wrong quite strongly, though not always. Elites can betray their own highest values too. So the fact that "outsiders" make errors is simply a given fact of science, and it will always be so viewed by the specialist insiders. The strong language Trask used merely manifests attitude, not facts. [Alice Faber has properly responded in part to this, I find since writing this.] If correction of Greenberg's errors leads to loss of his hypotheses, so be it, but let's discuss this based on facts, not on attitudes against outsiders by specialists. Comparison and its techniques is a specialty too, just as much as a particular language or language family can be a specialty. By the way, Benji Wald's mention of the following I find very interesting: "the selective circularity method which G's method is best equipped to attack" I have not seen any specialist historical/comparative linguists pointing out the value of G's method precisely in countering hypotheses of relationship of particular pairs of languages or language families (even with support of a comparative grammar!), when those comparisons were based on the limited knowledge of the specialist in one or two of those being compared who did not have an equivalent level of knowledge of other languages within sufficient geographic and genetic distance to reveal the non-genetic relation of the particular two being compared. The notion of "specialist" is not usually an empirical notion, it is usually a political one. On the other hand, notions like "careless" and "dilettante" can be applied to all, or not, equally. A specialist in one language who chances to see comparisons with one other, however much their knowledge of the one, is still a "dilettante" if they are not well grounded in historical / comparative techniques and the errors to which these like all techniques are subject, as well as other candidates for the comparison, and "careless" if they do not investigate other possible candidates, by exactly the same uses of the terms. And despite all of that, a "careless dilettante" may happen to have observed true cognate sets and have hit upon a correct relation of two languages. Once again, let's get rid of all this politics and deal with the data! Lloyd AndersonMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue