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One comment in the 'mainstream linguistics' discussion has stuck with me and bothers me. That is that teaching 'mere' language somehow puts you on the sidelines. Linguistics is and will always be subordinate to language and individual languages. For me, the real meat (as a former vegetarian, I would have preferred a different metaphor, but somehow 'tofu' didn't fit) of the subject I like best is to be found in language and languages. And there's hardly a better way to dig in and discover the treasures a language has to offer than by teaching it to people with a different native tongue, who don't take those 'treasures' for granted and thus fail to recognize them. Teaching English to Chinese in Taiwan, for example, has taught me more about English intonation (and thus intonation in general) than I think I could have learned from books or theoretically-oriented research--though I do read those, too. Karen S. Chung Dept. of Foreign Languages and Literatures National Taiwan University karchungMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueccms.ntu.edu.tw
As a Mexican who's been both under the influence of the country's political system, as well as various syntactic theories, I'm amused to see a comparison between the PRI and mainstream Linguistics. Can I just point out that the Mexican system is, among other things, not democratic because most people in the country are not 'democratic' (as the term is normally understood in the US, for example)? In other words, most do not behave as if they believe that disputes can by settled by rational argumentation, or that what counts is _what_ is said, and not _who_ says it, or that one should think in terms of individuals responsible for their own positions, and not in terms of groups that vie for power. The question is then: are then linguists, specially syntacticians, democratic? Ben Macias U Cambridge Computer Lab bmMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issuecl.cam.ac.uk
The most recent postings on the subject "Mainstream Linguistics" illustrate precisely what is wrong with the way the debate is tending to go. On the one hand, postings like Mark Llewellyn's may help to relieve feelings of frustration but they do little to improve communication across the the theoretical divide.. On the other hand, Pesetsky's posting illustrates exactly why such complaints are so tempting to the "case-theoretically challenged" among us. What good does it do anybody to compare mainstream linguists to the PRI of Mexico or to the Communist Party of China? Such comparisons, no matter how apt they may seem to the one flinging them around, are simply: name calling. The Linguist List has, so far, been mercifully free of flaming. Please let's keep it that way. Pesetsky's response may be summarized as follows: 1. We have the right to prefer to hire people whose views we think are *correct* and *likely to lead in interesting directions*. 2. So stop complaining. A response of this nature misses what the complaints are really about. Of course, people are going to choose to hire people whose work they consider worthwhile. That's not the issue. To explain the issue, consider the following hierarchy of "research worthiness": I. People whose research is both "correct" and theoretically interesting. II. People whose research I believe to be on the wrong track, but which is dealing with critical issues and is likely to yield interesting results. III. People whose research I believe to be based on fundamentally flawed assumptions, but who are still doing valuable work which may prove to be correct (though I doubt it). IV. People whose research is based on assumptions so fundamentally in error that it cannot possibly yield any useful information or lead to worthwhile lines of research. V. People whose research is better characterized as "pseudoscience" or ideology than as valid scientific inquiry. All of us categorize other people's research along these lines. But we differ as about where we rank things. Obviously, we want our universities to have lots of people doing (i), a smaller proportion of people doing II, and enough people doing III to protect us against getting stuck in blind alleys if it turns out that our assumptions were mistaken. We mostly read work by (i) and (ii), and try to stay conversant with the most important people doing (iii). If we judge someone falls into categories IV and V, we don't read their work and we don't even consider hiring someone of their ilk at our university. Now, the complaint against the "mainstream" is not that it exercises such preferential treatment, but that it operates with an extremely cramped definition definition of what constitutes "worthwhile linguistic research". The hierarchy that seems to be in operation is: I. Whatever is current at MIT. II. Other versions of the G.B./P.P.A. approach. III. Other generative theories, such as HPSG. IV. Other formal linguistic theories outside the generative tradition. V. Functional and cognitive theories of language. That is, the complaint that is really being made is that the "mainstream" is writing off dissident work as intellectually valueless, to the point of not needing to be answered or refuted or included (via university hiring decisions) in the ongoing disciplinary discourse. To the extent that this is true (and I know perfectly well that it is not true of all mainstream linguists), it has a fundamentally perverse effect on the way people structure their research. I have had people tell me in effect "the interesting part of my paper is in the data. Don't worry about the analysis; I put it in there to make the paper palatable to the audience I was presenting it to." If one must present one's work within very narrow parameters even to win it a hearing, the field is taking on an ideological tinge which is not conducive to genuine scientific discourse. Of course, if the research I am doing is NO GOOD for reasons other than its failure to conform to the current theoretical "mainstream", so be it. But I don't like being ignored when I am making points directly relevant to critical issues in the field. Writing off the dissidents guarantees that facts unsupportive of the current orthodoxy just won't be noticed. Some examples: If language is a distinct module, or faculty, we would not expect to find any direct connection in the brain between language and other fundamental cognitive abilities. And yet, the posterior language areas (Wernicke's area and the adjacent parts of the inferior parietal lobe) seem to be fundamentally involved in the visual perception of part whole structure. (see a 1991 article by Robertson & Lamb in Cognitive Psychology) Since constituency is fundamental to language, and may plausibly be viewed as a type of part/whole structure, the coincidence hardly seems coincidental: but it's the sort of thing one would not notice if one started with modular assumptions. Similarly, a syndrome like Williams syndrome is often cited as a pure case of preserved language abilities in the face of general cognitive deficit. And yet I have found references which indicate that Williams syndrome children are better at some types of spatial cognition (those involving details of spatial structure) than at others (those involving overall shapes and patterns). Since linguistic competence, too, is a matter of perceiving detailed structure the coincidence may not be coincidental. These are neurolinguistic examples. The purely linguistic examples These are neurolinguistic examples. The purely linguistic examples are familiar enough (at least in kind) not to belabor here. But the main point is simple: writing off the dissidents is to eliminate a presence which will notice facts that may prove critical to the future development of the field.Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue