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In his generally accurate post in LINGUIST 5.418, Paul Deane *appears* to accept a presuposition that I am pretty sure is inaccurate. The relevant paragraph begins: > Langacker's Cognitive Grammar is unique in its attempt to > REDUCE syntax to abstract semantic patterns. At least as most readers of the list are likely to interpret "semantic", this is almost antithetical to a central Cognitive Grammmar premise: that grammar is essentially symbolic. Langacker characterizes a grammar as a "structured inventory of conventional linguistic units". In his most recent major work (_Foundations of Cognitive Grammar II_, 1991) he says (p. 514): "Te central claim of cognitive grammar is that language is fully describable is terms of semantic structures, phonological structures, *and* [my emphasis] symbolic links between the two. Only symbolic structures need be posited for the characterization of lexicon, morphology, and syntax, which form a gradation that can be divided only arbitrarily into discrete components." Note that it is *symbolic* structures (i.e. links between semantic and phonological structures) which are central---not semantic ones alone. Langacker's above claim is made more explicit as the "content requirement": "The only structures ascribable to a linguistic system are (1) semantic, phonological, and symbolic structures that occur overtly as (parts of) expressions, (2) schematizations of permitted structures. and (3) categorizing relations between permitted structures." (op. cit. p. 546) What might not be apparent to all who read the above without its fuller context is that most of what many call "syntax" is included, not under the "semantic" part of (1), but under (2)---as schematizations of *phonological* structures. And Langacker goes to considerable effort to support the claim that linguistic *forms* (including the form of grammatical constructions) are essentially phonological. What perhaps obscures this position is that much of his work (and of many of his students and other fellow practitioners) is devoted o describing and justifying the *meanings* of grammatical morphemes and constructions. But the claim that constructions (etc.) have meanings is fully consistent with regarding their *forms* as *phonological*. I think few Langackerian cognitive grammarians (if any) would claim that constructions consist solely of or reduce to their meanings. Larry Gorbet Anthropology and Linguistics Depts. University of New MexicoMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Of course, the movement from temporal to spatial meaning is back-and-forth but the temporal meanings of locative cases seem to derive from what is in some sense a "more basic" spatial meaning. Perhaps the question should be "in what sense are the spatial meanings 'more basic'", i.e. what makes us think that the spatial senses are more basic? In English, of course, people constantly say things like "We haven't stopped for gas since Pittsburgh", "That was five towns/restaurants/gas stations ago", "Until Rotterdam he thought otherwise". The interesting aspect of all this to me is that while speakers have no difficulty in distinguishing time from space, case and adposition systems never do so. Thus there is no language that I know which has lexical items ambiguous, say, between country and year, state and month, city and day, street and hour. Yet all languages combine time and space relations in their grammatical systems. It is a major problem for functionalist accounts of grammar, yet the only responses to it that I have seen all resort to Gesamtbedeugungen. --RBeardMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue