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I'm a little surprised about how few comments have been made to Steven Pinker's book. I suppose it's on a number of people's summer reading list, and that most haven't gotten to it yet. For me, however, it has been a revelation, not so much in the content--it's not aimed a professional audience--but in how useful it is in getting across the message. My students, elementary school teachers and future elementary school teachers, are often, how can I put it, 'analytically differently abled.' I mean you're talking 2.something undergrad GPAs on average. However, this spring I assigned a couple of chapters as optional readings, and found the ones who read it enthusiastically discussing language as a "discrete combinatorial system" without even blinking. There was not a single dissenter. More than one went out and purchased a copy. One said her husband complained about her laughing in bed. (Why she was doing her course reading in bed is another story, but they work very hard, and I can't blame her.) They even claimed to understand his chapter "How language works," and there wasn't a single complaint about the trees. Those who have taught structure of English classes for teachers can probably really appreciate that accomplishment. Furthermore, they saw (with some encouragement from me) that the understanding of language acquistion the book gives were directly related to their own teaching, a central point with them. It became clear just how necessary the idea of an innate language faculty is to whole-language teaching, the predominant methodology promoted at OSU. Some even took it on their own initiative to investigate the methods by which children in their schools get classified as "language deficit" or in need of some sort of speech therapy. By comparison, most of the class struggled through Halliday and Hasan, who much more than Pinker attempt to relate their theory to teaching. Of course, I don't agree with everything in the book. I find there is too much faith in application of logical principles to language. For example he argues that singular THEY is permitted on the basis of the nonreferentiality of the pronoun. I think the choice of pronoun is meaningful and obeys pragmatic criteria. Further, his criticism of the language mavens, while mostly on target in the particulars, does not show an understanding of the nature of prescription. For example, the fact that prescription has existed since Panini shows that it has a functionality that goes beyond being a silly fashion that started in the 18th century as Pinker implies. However, these are relatively minor quibbles in a work that communicates the large and small notions of what linguistics is about so effectively. I should note also, I am a lot more sympathetic philosphically and theoretically than Claudia Brugman is in terms of acceptance of modularity and other theoretical issues. Finally, unlike Brugman, I don't see anything in the book that could remotely be considered linguist bashing. The book is now on my required list for my Applied Linguistics course in the fall, and will be in any other course of that nature that I teach. Michael Newman Dept. of Educational Theory & Practice The Ohio State University MNEWMANMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueMAGNUS.ACS.OHIO-STATE.EDU
I've worked on chaotic linguistics & complexity over the past few years and was interested to see your e-Mail message. I only received my e-Mail facility yesterday, which is why I have not responded earlier. The trouble I have with most proponents in other disicplines working with these concepts is that they seem to be somewhat neo-positivistic. And when applied to language (as e.g. in Ballmer and associates) they merely accept what I call the Language Myth and all its variations -- eg the grammar myth. In following the interpretation of linguistic history by Roy Harris -- ex-Oxford -- there are many linguistic "facts" we have inherited from our predecessors which we accepts as God-s given truth, but when we analyse the development of these concepts against their cultural backdrops, we notice that they were introduced for quite different purposes, yet we merely take them as fact without scrutiny -- biologising grammatical categories as Chomsky and many cognitisvists have done is one example of how a mythical notion (grammar) received physical ontogolocal status. In my view there is no point in merely using more modern tools (such as chaology and complexity) and applying them to inherited mythical concepts about language. Whilst these tools have very powerful explanatory power, in order to understand that thing we call language we will also have to revise our concepts of language -- a kind of quantum revolution is necessary in the investigation of language. I would love to get involved in conversations regarding these topics.Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue