Editor for this issue: T. Daniel Seely <seely
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If one is asked to predict or formalize WHICH analogies are formed in fact, diachrony and synchrony have to be treated separately. First, grammaticalization (for instance) is a diachronic process, and all linguistic changes are unpredictable. Therefore, if grammaticalization is viewed as analogical (with respect both to reanalysis and to extension), then any theory that would claim to be able to predict which analogies will be made would be falsified eo ipso. Second, as far as synchrony is concerned, it IS possible to formalize analogy. To do so, one only needs to retain the traditional notion of analogy as a matter of form-AND-meaning (i.e. analogy-1) and reject the homonymous neologism that treats analogy as a matter of form (i.e. analogy-2). Only if one adopts analogy-2 (i.e. the aberrant, formalist notion of analogy) can one claim - and with perfect justification - that 'analogy does not exist', and support this claim with the ungrammaticalness of 'I saw the barn red' and the like. Thus, it is trivially true that analogy-2 does not exist. (This was pointed out also by Farrell and Israel.) Less trivially, analogy-1 both exists and can be formalized. More precisely, the formalization of analogy-1 is not just a possibility; rather, it is a FACT (cf. Esa Itkonen & Jussi Haukioja: 'A rehabilitation of analogy in syntax (and elsewhere)', in: A. Kertesz (ed.): Metalinguistik im Wandel: die kognitive Wende' in Wissenschaftstheorie und Linguistik. Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang, 1997, pp. 131-177). So far, the formalization (carried out in PROLOG) covers a fragment of English syntax (including wellknown counter-examples which thus turn out to be fictitious), but it can be (analogically) extended indefinitely. Now that the traditional notion of analogy (i.e. analogy-1) has been first distinguished from the formal 'analogy' (i.e. analogy-2) and then formalized, one sincerely hopes that diffuse a priori claims to the effect that 'analogy does not exist' will quietly subside. Esa ItkonenMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
>Consider the following case discussed by Chomsky in his discussion (in the >video "Human Language Series, Part II) "of what he considers to >be the failure of analogy-based approaches to language >acquisition : > >The boy paints the red barn : The boy paints the barn red :: >The boy sees the red barn: The boy sees the barn red > >... the analogy is UNREASONABLE. Sorry, I just had to do this... The boy puts red-tinted glasses on, I put on green. There is a white barn outside. When we go out, **the boy sees the barn red**, while I see it green! >The case brought up by Speas > >> John is easy to please : To please John is easy :: >> John is eager to please : To please John is eager. What about this? Does it count if you use commas? A: John seems so eager to please and help out. B: Well yes... **to please, John is eager**, it is true, but to help out ... well, he's more of a hindrance than a help. analogy rulz, ok :-) Robert Petterson International Pacific CollegeMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue