Editor for this issue: Ann Dizdar <dizdar
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The argument of Chomsky's, as restated for us by Dan Everett, that certain proposed linguistic principles must be linguistic and not general-cognitive, because they are not statABLE in any terms other than linguistic, strikes me fallacious. And not just because I do not, as Dan correctly surmises, have much use for most of Chomsky's work since 1965 or so, but for a specific reason. It is the emphasized -ABLE (my emphasis) that bothers me. All I know is that the various island constraints and so on have not been statED in more general terms, not that they are not statABLE in such terms. I wish that people would start making a clear distinction between cases where we really know something is impossible (we have lots of such results, due to Bohr, Go"del, Turing, etc.) and where we have no idea what might or might not be possible (in part because we have not tried). There seem to be few if any genuine impossibility results in linguistics or cognitive science generally. However, on the other hand, the strategy of doing linguistics as best we can and ignoring the rest of cognition, which seems to me to be Chomsky's no less and no more than that of most linguists, precisely because we have no ideas to compare the linguistic ones to. So what I urge is that we make a clear distinction between saying that we have no choice but to do linguistics AS THOUGH it were distinct from the rest of cognition, but that we have no basis whatever for saying that linguistic principles which we discover as a result either ARE or ARE NOT special cases of more general cognitive principles. Modularity is a valid, indeed the only valid, methodological approach linguistics can follow in practice, but I see no basis whatever for making any assertions one way or the other about its validity as a claim about the organization of human cognition--OR ANY NEED TO. The only difference between a linguist who simply does linguistics and one who does linguistics and in addition makes completely unfounded assertions about the nature of the mind is that the latter is (dishonestly in my view) seeking to get more attention for doing the same kind work as the former. Alexis MRMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
Dan Everett and John Limber both complain about my summary of the difference between the roles of `economy' in Minimalism and in earlier work. What I said was the following: > dh: The earlier types of `economy' applied to the activity of the > *linguist* writing a grammar: assume the minimum of rules, categories, > etc. The new kind of economy is surely completely different, as it > applies to the *user*. I think Esa Itkonen is right. I stand by it, though I accept that it's rather too economically expressed. In Minimalism economy applies to the generation of a particular sentence, so that the structure generated should be the most economical one possible for that string of words (etc.). It certainly controls the activity of the user, in the sense of someone using the grammar to generate a structure (and maybe it applies to speakers and hearers too). In contrast, old-style economy was just Occam's Razor applied to the linguist's analysis in a fairly uncontroversial way - other things being equal, assume as few categories and as few rules or principles as possible. As Everett and Limber both point out, it made sense when applied to the linguist's analysis because it also seemed likely to apply to the language-learner's analysis (though of course there was some doubt as to whether economy of this type really was relevant to the latter). But it did *not* apply to the way the language-user applied the grammar once learned, in contrast with Minimalism. So I was contrasting the old-style economy, which applied to both linguist and learner, with new-style economy, which applies to the user. ============================================================================ Prof Richard Hudson Tel: +44 171 387 7050 ext 3152 E-mail: r.hudsonMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueling.ucl.ac.uk Dept. of Phonetics and Linguistics Tel: +44 171 380 7172 Fax: +44 171 383 4108 UCL Gower Street London WC1E 6BT UK