Editor for this issue: Martin Jacobsen <marty
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I agree with Di Kilpert to the extent that there is a huge gap between what linguists think and what the public thinks about language. Non-linguists generally persist with their evaluative attitudes to language despite their lack of rationality. I also agree that when linguists decide to describe rather than prescribe, they have already in some way declared their adherence to certain cultural values that differ from the mainstream. In that sense, they are not being absolutely objective. But of course, there are degrees of objectivity. However, I think that the influence of professional linguists on public attitudes should not be exagerrated. In the discussion on ebonics that took place on this list a few months ago, it was noteworthy that numerous contributors bemoaned the fact that they could do little to convince non-linguists that all language varieties were essentially equal. Also, it should not be forgotten that the principle of linguistic equality is not new, although it has been particularly emphasized by sociolinguists: the neo-grammarians of the last century were quite contemptuous towards linguistic purists, whom they saw as an obstacle to a proper scientific understanding of sound change. Far from losing public confidence, it seems likely that descriptive linguists never really had it in the first place. I agree that subjective attitudes to language have been seriously neglected by linguists, probably because of the broad consensus on linguistic equality. Consequently linguists have been charged with excessive liberalism and held responsible for the decline of literacy skills in British and American schools for example. At the same time it is difficult to imagine on what other basis linguists could proceed without becoming embroiled in bizarre debates on, say, the supposed superiority of French over English because of the higher abstractedness of French and hence its greater capacity for handling ideas. In addition, people who complain about the 'abuse' of the language never seem to have any problems in gaining access to the media, whereas the voice of reason struggles to be heard. So, in brief, my answer to Di Kilpert is that I can't really agree that linguists have damaged their public reputation, but their neglect of subjective attitudes as a phenomenon worth studying in itself has certainly not helped their cause. I also think that the abandonment of the linguistic equality principle would be far too high a price to pay to pay for the reconciliation of public and professional attitudes to language. I fear such an abandonment would take us back to the days when people were "convicted of speaking their own language." Alan Smith, School of Modern Languages, Dept of French University of Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU U.K. E-mail: alan.smithMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issuencl.ac.uk Fax: (0191)2225442
Di Kilpert writes: >"My concern is that outsiders' misunderstanding of linguists' >anti-prescriptivism has damaged the image of linguistics. I also >have a sneaking suspicion that there is no such thing as pure >description in linguistics. The anti-prescriptivist stance seems to >me responsible for a lot of linguistic split personalities." I have to interpret what the various assertions here mean in order to respond. Generally, my feeling is that linguists have at best been ineffectual and at worst made enemies by failing to contextualize their anti-prescriptivist remarks. That is, by ignoring the social underpinnings of prescriptivism and how it is inseparable from social use of language, many linguists have underestimated the difficulty of the anti-presciptivist stance being understood by outsiders. In favo of linguists, however, it seems to me that outsiders generally do not consciously understand the origins and social motivations of their own prescriptivist opinions, and their attempts to defend those opinions are almost always naive (when not merely sophistic), misguided and/or downright wrong. The cliche'd attack on English multiple negation with "two negative make a positive" is typical, and representative of a larger class of prescriptivist rationalizations to the effect that a PROscribed grammatical construction (or whatever) "ain't *logical*", cf. the attack on expressions such as "more unique". Thus, when prescriptivists offer "logic" in defense of one of their rationalizations, they fail to understand the real reason why some particular grammatical construction is proscribed. Getting back to linguists, they can see the fallacy in such rationalizations all right, and recognize that languages have their own "logics" (the discovery of which is what linguistics is about), but they generally fail in just the same area as their opponents do, in explaining where prescriptivism comes from and what it's all about. As for the notion that there's no "pure" description in linguistics, I have difficulty understanding the intent of that remark. The best I can come up with is that linguists have some difficulty in recognizing what is indeed possible in their own language, or whatever language they're describing with the aid of speakers who may very well be victims of irresistable prescriptivism even when encouraged not to be. The whole issue of what is grammatical may be involved, with such ancillary concepts as "semi-grammatical", "not great but better than some other construction", etc etc. -- the whole problem of "grammaticality". But I don't think this is what was intended. More likely it's something about unconscious prescriptivism, for reasons other than some theoretical inclination, and is a phenomenon familiar to sociolinguists dealing with the judgments of speakers of subordinate and/or stigmatized language varieties, such that their judgments are at variance with regularities in their spontaneous speech behavior. So I can see a point to the remark, but I cannot further comment on it without clarification of its intent. The part about linguistic split personalities harks back to what I said above about the social bases of prescriptivism, such that linguists might not be able to consistently practice what they preach with regard to anti-prescriptivism -- and we must note that prescriptivist conditioning starts early in life, before introduction to linguistic theory, and has its visceral side. (NB linguists and outsiders both share this particular visceral side as socially conditioned speakers of the same language, whereas there is also a visceral side to linguistic theory, including the anti-prescriptivist doctrine, which is naturally peculiar to linguists, and as incomprehensible -- and unpredictable, regardless of "logic" -- to outsiders as prescriptivist prejudices in one language are in general to speakers who do not know that language.) In principle the schizophrenia is somewhat analogous to the possibility of a linguist being scientifically rigorous and at the same time a religious fundamentalist, even to the extent of accepting some version of the Tower of Babel story of linguistic diversity (contra the linguistic concept of Proto-World, the shattered original language). Such linguists do exist, and undoubtedly anti-prescripitivist split-personalities are even more common. But does Di have anyone in particular in mind? Names are not at issue, just the basis for suggesting such a type. >Second, I would be very happy to hear from anyone who is into the >works of Roy Harris. I'm not familiar with the works of Roy Harris, but am curious about what the relationship is between that and the preceding statements. So, I stand by for further clarifications. -- BenjiMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue