Editor for this issue: Elaine Halleck <elaine
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I think both Alexis Manaster Ramer and Scott Stirling are missing a fundamental point. Scott says: I think it should be pointed out that there is no linguistic or otherwise scientific argument against prescriptivism. The most important argument against prescriptivism is simply that descriptivism is possible - that it is possible to study language as it actually is, rather than as we might wish it to be. Prescriptivism is pure dogma, which can only exist in the absence of an alternative. It says that infinitives should not be split, but gives no reason or evidence. Descriptivists say that infinitives are split every day, and can produce evidence by the lorry-load. Saying that there's no linguistic or otherwise scientific argument against prescriptivism is like saying there's no scientific argument against alchemy. Once proper chemistry exists, alchemy is unnecessary. Of course language is different from chemistry because any language is itself a set of social prescriptions; but those prescriptions are facts, unlike the ones invented by prescriptivists. What's wrong with prescriptivism is that its supposed facts are just inventions. Scott also says: I think linguists should face the fact that as scientists they have no more authority or reason to claim that all languages must be treated equally than does a geneticist to say that all people should be treated equally. Linguists don't say that they should be treated equally. What we say is that from the point of view of structure, they *are* equal. The jump to equality of treatment is an ethical one, not based on science. But at least it's based on true beliefs, which is not the case for the converse ethic of prescriptivists. =============================================================================== Richard (=Dick) Hudson Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT work phone: +171 419 3152; work fax: +171 383 4108 email: dickMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueling.ucl.ac.uk web-sites: home page = http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/dick/home.htm unpublished papers available by ftp = ....uk/home/dick/papers.htm
I disagree with Scott Stirling. I think there are linguistic/scientific arguments against prescriptivism. What immediately comes to mind is the fact that all languages change, yet human communication has not been reduced to grunts and growls. If, as many prescriptivists claim overtly or implicity, language change is equivalent to "degradation," then no one should be able to communicate at all by now. Tom PayneMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
>I think it should be pointed out that there is no linguistic or otherwise scientific argument against prescriptivism. Linguists tend to make arguments from authority that presciptivism is bad or wrong, without realizing that they are making an ethical or otherwise philsophical point. While prescriptivists often misunderstand or are just ignorant of the linguistic facts, linguists are just as ignorant about the types of value judgements they make proscribing prescriptivism. I think linguists should face the fact that as scientists they have no more authority or reason to claim that all languages must be treated equally than does a geneticist to say that all people should be treated equally. The realms of scientific fact and social prescriptivism are quite different; linguists are just as likely to misrepresent a social value as a scientific truth as are prescriptivists. The best scientific argument against prescriptivism is to define it as "an attempt radically to change language, about the origins of and reasons for which its proponents are unconcerned." If that's not science by itself, it's at least empirical data that English prescriptivism can easily result in indigestible English. Joseph Goldberg Research Phonetics Motorola Speech Synthesis and Machine Learning Laboratorie Schaumburg, ILMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
A. Manaster Ramer writes: >.... a number of distinguishied linguists have been involved >over the years with the publication of essentially prescriptive >works, such as dictionaries, both in the English-speaking world >(where this might be least expected) and even more so in other >places (where linguists' jobs are to a large extent defined as >to include work on defining what the standard language should be). >This is perhaps THE major obstacle to taking seriously the idea >that linguistics is really dedicated to doing away with prescriptivism. The subtleties of Alexis's observations call for comment. The first is that it is a misunderstanding to suppose that linguistics is "dedicated" to "doing away with prescriptivism", *except in its own field*, where it is as necessary to linguistic science as doing away with metaphysics has been to the physical sciences. (Actually, it's even more necessary to linguistic science, since experimental science checks metaphysical tendencies in physical sciences. But what kind of linguistics could adopt Sr Isaac Newton's motto "I make no hypotheses", by which he meant he only describes what is "obvious" from experiments, i.e., empirical observation? That's difficult in linguistics because it is the study of ourselves, and we experience a paradoxically observable and unobservable mental life, which includes literal *INsight* into language, and a "feeling in our bones" -- that our analysis is right) Any further dedication to "doing away with prescriptivism" would require political activism (or something like that), and is independent of the linguistic enterprise, even though the social injustices caused by various forms of blind prescriptivism certainly spur many individual linguists to venture into the public arena in order to relieve their frustration, bid for the social relevance of their discipline, and, if possible, use their expertise and authority to do some social good. Most importantly, the kinds of advisory capacities to dictionaries and such, by which linguists seek to augment their incomes, are in no way signs of complicity (or duplicity?) in the tyranny of prescriptivism. This is because the standard language of the dictionaries, no less than any other form of language, is susceptible to rational analysis (even though by its genesis and social function the standard is a different kind of animal from "normal" languages). Thus, to the extent that linguists have experience in rational analysis of language, and, given the evidence of their own use of the written standard, have some familiarity with it, they are competent to advise dictionary publishers, e.g., in such matters as how to alphabetize phrasal verbs, etc. (not to mention marking parts of speech, and supplying etymologies and Indo-European or whatever roots). In a way, their role in making the standard language available does not directly involve prescriptivism, but is analogous to the relation between the religious and secular authorities in Medieval Europe (among other places). Like the religious authorities they can use their learning of doctrine to determine if a heresy has been committed. That doctrine is universal, immutable and independent of the State. However, once they have arrived at a conclusion, they must turn the defendant over to the secular authorities who are an independent body and alone have the right to determine an appropriate course of action, whether it be persecution, execution, electrocution or elocution. Likewise, the linguistic authorities can advise on what is standard and should go in the dictionary, but only the Board of Rules of Scrabble can decide whether to eject a player from the game for the crime of persisting in inventing ad hoc and fantastic(al) words that ain't in the dictionary. P.S. Alexis's point becomes most interesting in the role of some linguists in the relation of "prescriptivism" to *linguistic engineering* of a standard, where none existed before. This is part of "modern state building", and involves a tremendous amount of social consideration, having nothing to do with internal analysis of the "language". For example, in some cases, determined by sociopolitical considerations, a word will be recommended for the standard because it is used with a particular meaning in varieties (considered for contribution to the standard) spoken by 90% of the population, rather than 1% of the population. This is not necessarily a bad (or unjust) thing, though 1% of the population may disagree. I think that Alexis's comments serve to alert us to the ambiguities of what we mean by "prescriptivism". Is it the same as "(the process of) standardization"? Is there a social angle to this problem, e.g., that "standardization" is done autocratically by a small group, e.g., linguists and the people who pay them, rather than democratically by a referendum (in which the affected population votes for one out of a list of candidates -- for each word?) - BenjiMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue