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AMR writes: >There are many cultures in which children are spared >this kind of (mis)treatment [i.e., what William Morris describes as the content of elementary and secondary language studies], >and I would think that anyone who in >principle objects to prescriptivism would object here too. On the >other hand, as I said before, I have the (uneasy) feeling that human >beings somehow "like" to be prescribed to, and I do not know how to >resolve this paradox. AMR's unease is misguided, as is much of our discussion, because the need for prescriptivism actually reveals a certain amount of native sophistication in those prescribed to, and thereby reveals the pragmatic legitimacy of certain kinds of prescriptivism. People know that there are different varieties of language spoken in different communities: young vs. old, South vs. New England vs. Midwest vs. West, upper vs. middle vs. lower class, general vs. slang vs. jargon, etc. >From this practical everyday experience, they know that language is "conventional," though of course they have never been taught the meaning of "convention" as a metalinguistic jargon term, nor discussed it as a design feature of language. People have the same practical understanding of convention as they have of the Gricean principles of cooperative communication: be truthful, relevant, clear, concise, ... They know these principles implicitly by the experience they have had with the complements: lies, bad topic shifts, confusion, and blather. And some people know the principles because they themselves have unintentionally broken them; they have mis-stated facts, wandered off topic, been unclear, and run on unneeded. People who need to communicate broadly, especially through writing, will naturally seek out descriptions of the conventions they can use to communicate clearly and concisely with the largest possible audience and with the least possible difficulty for both the writer and the readers. Moreover, the communication works best when both writers and readers (!) are seeking out the conventions for mutual use. The flouting of those conventions is not for mere communication, but for art, as in Faulker, Joyce, Pound, or Queneau. Elsewhere, when conventions are not shared -- or not used -- there are corresponding disfluencies of communication of varying degrees of severity. Language is conventional and communication is cooperative. The interaction of those two concepts defines the legitimate function of prescriptivism: the documentation and diffusion of useful conventions for communication, and possibly their refinement. Objecting to prescriptivism "on principle," and in particular in the elementary and secondary school setting, is a horribly short-sighted policy. It denies people the tools they need to communicate - and be communicated with - effectively and efficiently. It is not the case, however, that the people we generally refer to as prescriptivists typically confine their activities to what I have termed legitimate prescriptivism. For instance, I once watched half an hour of TV with Wm. F. Buckley, John Simon, and some other word maven debating the precise level of sesquipedalianism they were entitled to oblige their readers to decode. None of them seemed to grasp the simple fact that their readers played an active role in that process, by deciding whether to read that particular article, whether to look up the obscure word or reference in a dictionary or encyclopedia, or indeed whether to ever read the writer's column again. This kind of "deus ex lexica" paternalism is certainly enough to make most of us retch, but what probably serves as the real source of the anti-prescriptive rancor among many linguists is the purveyance of prescriptions justified by the purported authority of some pseudo-explanation of how language works. We, as linguists, are uniquely qualified to recognize how often these pseudo-explanations are inaccurate, trivial, incomplete, invalid, just plain false, and sometimes even patently ridiculous. We are also uniquely threatened by the popular understanding of prescription as the natural goal of language studies, including linguistics. Witness, for instance, the knuckle-rapping schoolmarm on the cover of the Atlantic Monthly of April 1997, to illustrate Robert D. King's article against (!) the prescriptivist-supported English-Only movement. Witness, also, the pathetic inability of the press to identify and headline linguists -- not educators, not columnists, not literati, but real honest-to-God linguists -- to explain and discuss Ebonics last winter. Clearly, the nation doesn't know what we do and can't find us when it needs to, and one of the reasons is the distraction caused by prescriptivist quackery. Consider, for instance, the proscription of (double and) multiple negation. The hoary claim is that sentences like 1) I ain't never taken none o' that nonsense from nobody. contravene logic, because the negatives negate one another serially, possibly resulting for this sentence in a "real meaning" of something like 2) I have at least once taken some of that nonsense from someone. The remedy, in order to mean what you mean to mean, is to produce something like 3) That's nonsense, and I have never taken such nonsense from anyone. I have no idea if any of the living prescriptivists has actually publicly promoted this explanation, but that's really beside the point. We (North Americans at least, and probably literate English speakers the world over) were told this by well meaning primary school teachers when we learned to write, so we share an understanding of "It's not logical" as the reason multiple negation doesn't work. But of course it does work, and it works quite well. We all encounter oral productions of multiple negations, and from the pragmatics we all intuit that multiple negations add emphasis rather than flipping truth values. On those rare occasions when multiple negatives cause confused interpretations, we learn that the repair strategy is not to repeat the sentence slowly, but to rephrase it altogether. Plus, in the flow of conversation, we don't stop to analyze whether the confusion was caused by multiple negations, a mislaid pronoun antecedent, or just some vocabulary the interlocutor didn't know. Faced, subconsciously, with the failure of the "logicity" argument against multiple negations, or with any of a number of other invalid explanations of language phenomena, people do not think (subconsciously?) to themselves, "Oh, those silly prescriptivists are at it again. We're so lucky we have the linguists there to explain what's _really_ going on!" Most people have neither the time, the need, nor the inclination to sort out the quacks from the competent in language arguments. What they do is classify all language experts, us included, as fairly harmless loonies, then they go comfortably on doing with language whatever has worked for them in the past. So how does that dismissal of prescriptivists and their explanations square with AMR's observation that people seek out prescriptions? Well, consider what we know about patterns of use of multiple negation. (For one thing, there is a small group of people for whom the use of multiple negation does follow logical patterns. Logicians and mathematicians, and perhaps programmers, sometimes use multiple negations as jargon during oral discussion of work that would be represented on paper as equations. Educated regular folks occasionally work this into normal conversations using well placed contrastive accent: "The painting's not UNattractive, it's just not aTTRACtive." Jargon usage among experts is interesting here, because it supports the prescriptivist explanation people know is ultimately invalid, so it can further justify condemning the whole field as too messy to sort out. However, it does not really seem pertinent to resolving the issue of cognitive dissonance about prescription.) The use of multiple negation for emphasis is primarily associated with the oral language use of uneducated and working class speakers. The avoidance of multiple negation is primarily associated with the written language use of educated and upper or middle class speakers. People know that use or avoidance of multiple negation conveys social and stylistic information about the talker. Those who are capable of mastering a broad spectrum of linguistic tools will learn to use multiple negation appropriately to achieve the communicative goals they set for the situation they are in, whether that means avoiding it while composing a doctoral dissertation or using it while chatting informally with a childhood friend. So people seek out prescriptions as tools with which to serve their communicative needs. Such tools must be given at least in language arts classes in primary and secondary school, unless we want to form students who are crippled by ineptitude in written, and possibly oral, communication. If we also want to engender a healthy skepticism about prescriptivism to replace the smatterings of servility and contempt we occasionally encounter, and as a bonus help the professional image of linguistics by distinguishing it from quack prescriptivism, we can push for secondary and university curricula which point out true and false explanations of linguistic phenomena, and the function of convention in the social facets of language and communication. Perhaps that will be addressed by some of the participants in the symposium on introductory linguistics courses on Jan. 8 at the LSA meeting in New York. Happy Holidays to all. Tom SawallisMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue
I lurk on this list as a high school foreign language teacher. The way teachers in my school are divided over prescriptivism is roughly like this: those of us who have read Quinn, Pinker, and other debunkers of the language mavens (Pinker's term) pride ourselves on knowing, e.g. the history of the slow/slowly set of adjectives/adverbs going back to Old English. We certainly do not advocate having students write: he did it like kind of slow...unless they are writing dialogue representative of their peers' colloquial speech. The question of correctness: he did it slow OR he did it slowly... can be discussed by referring to Fowler and other guides. Our colleagues on the other side of the issue will simply not discuss it. They see Fowler as an authority, not a guide, and would not consult Fowler or anything else, in any case. What is important to them, IMHO, is the right to draw lines between us and them: between teachers and students, between middle-class and lower-class, between native English-speakers and immigrants, between the old Anglo, Mormon component of the community and the newcomers from the Midwest, sometimes non- White, between the academic teachers and the coaches/administrators/vo-ag & shop teachers, etc. etc. etc. This latter group sees itself as defending high standards, high Culture, European civilization (I am not exaggerating), and academic integrity against those of us who would give points to students just for being minorities, just because they try hard, just because they are poor, just because we are too lazy to grade papers, and because we are currying favor with the administration and multicultural gurus. My colleagues and I try to engage in dialogue with these folks but they just don't want to talk about it. One teacher told me: I just wave the style manual at them and say: Here's the bar, jump over it! and she walked away allowing no response. That is typical. Now, regardless of all the fascinating discussion on this list about just what prescriptivism is, that is what teachers at all levels deal with on a daily basis and I know this is also true at the college and university level. So when I say prescriptivism, I am not talking about teaching students to write Standard English; I am talking about a way of dividing students into winners and losers. PBarr21106Mail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issueaol.com Pat Barrett Mesa, AZ