Editor for this issue: Anthony Rodrigues Aristar <aristar
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[Reply to Chris Hogan's question on OT, LINGUIST 8.457] I think that the basic question about the epistemological status of OT does not concern its falsifiability. Even if OT specified which constraints are permitted in the theory, the entire theory would probably not be affected whenever constraints might be shown to be 'falsified'. The reason is that constraint falsification could always be viewed by OT supporters as constraint violation. Now, as is well-known, OT constraints are violable by definition. This is perhaps the more (if not the only) interesting feature in OT with respect to previous approaches : let us not be afraid of exceptions ; exceptions do exist, and are, thereby, marked. The important point, from which it can be shown that OT is NOT a linguistic theory nor a theory tout court, is that constraints are formally arbitrary and thereby circular. Let us take constraints like 'syllables must have onsets' or 'syllables must not have codas'. These constraints are arbitrary insofar as nothing but empirical observation tells us why onsets should be obligatory, while codas should not. As a result, the so-called 'emergence of the unmarked' hides, in fact, mere circularity in OT approaches to syllable structure. Why is a given system unmarked rather than marked ? Because it fails to violate the constraints posited by the theory. But why does the theory posit a given constraint rather than its contrary ? Because this is what we find in unmarked systems. In sum, OT must run after the facts because it does not provide an independent theory of markedness (for syllable structure in the present case), contrary to what should be expected from a real linguistic theory. Joaquim Brandao de Carvalho 1, rue Henri Poincare 75020 Paris France Tel. : (0033) 1 43643418 Faculte des Sciences Humaines et Sociales - Sorbonne Universite Rene Descartes - Paris VMail to author|Respond to list|Read more issues|LINGUIST home page|Top of issue