This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions. A selection of debates discussing central issues in cognitive science. The debates are written by renowned experts in the field. The debates cover the middle ground as well as the extremes. The book addresses topics such as the amount of innate knowledge, boundedrationality and the role of perception in action. It provides a valuable overview of the field in a clear and easily comprehensible form.

Notes on Contributors Preface Just How Modular Is The Mind? 1. The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind Peter Carruthers 2. Is the Mind Really Modular? Jesse Prinz 3. Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? Richard Samuels How Much Knowledge Of Language Is Innate? 4. Irrational Nativist Exhuberance Geoff Pullum and Barbara Scholz 5. The Case for Linguistic Nativism Robert Matthews 6. On the Innateness of Language James A. McGilvray Has cognitive science shown that human beings are cognitively bounded, or irrational? 7. Bounded and Rational Gerd Gigerenzer 8. Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue David Matheson Are rules and representations necessary to explain systematicity? 9. Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules Terrence Horgan and John Tienson 10. Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective Bill Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen Can consciousness and qualia be reduced? 11. Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced William Lycan 12. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced Brie Gertler Does cognitive science need external content at all? 13. Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) Ray Jackendoff 14. The Intentional Inexistence of Language Georges Rey Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? 15. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? Kirk Ludwig 16. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the 'No' Side Chris Viger Can mental states, knowledge in particular, be divided into a narrow component and a broad component? 17. Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components? Tim Williamson 18. The Internal and External Components of Cognition Ralph Wedgwood Index