Discussion Details
| Title: | Review of 'Chomsky's Minimalism' |
| Submitter: | Noel Burton-Roberts |
| Description: | Two recent postings to this list, have discussed the question whether
syntax 'comes after' semantics, or semantics 'comes after syntax. I believe both answers, and the question itself, are suspect. Wolfram Hinzen (19.2754, Disc: Review of 'Chomsky's Minimalism') writes 'There is, as far as I know, no evidence, in fact, that semantics of the human kind is possible in the absence of a suitable syntax or generative system that supports such a semantics. If so, semantics, not only cannot, but must come after syntax, and it is a genuine insight of the generative tradition that what kinds of semantic interpretations we get, systematically depends on which syntactic structures a mind can and does compute.' I agree (a) that semantics is impossible 'in the absence of a suitable syntax or generative system that supports such a semantics'. But Wolfram’s conclusion (b) that semantics must therefore 'come after' syntax does not follow. The correct conclusion to be drawn from (a) is that there can be no question of the 'ordering' syntax and semantics because - in the sense of 'syntax' assumed in (a) - syntax just IS the syntax-of-semantics (semantic structure). The question of which 'comes first' could only arise in respect of some kind of syntax other than the syntax-of-semantics. What is referred to as 'syntax' in generative grammar is generally not thought of as the syntax-of-semantics. Rather, semantics is thought of as the semantics-of-syntax. Is it this second variety of syntax that Wofram is suggesting 'comes before' semantics? Given the derivational character of generative grammar, this might seem reasonable. The derivational idea here is: first generate your syntactic structure and then assign it a semantic interpretation (consistent with the view of semantics as the semantics-of-syntax). But, to repeat, this is a variety of syntax distinct from that assumed in (a). However, even in respect of this second variety of syntax, the question of ordering is suspect. It can only be right to say that a syntactic structure (of the second variety) is 'assigned' a semantics if it indeed *has* a semantics. The question of 'when', in our theoretical model, we assign it *its* semantics is irrelevant. It doesn’t thereby and at that point *acquire* semantic properties. The derivational metaphor is misleading in this respect. The theoretical ordering assumed in (derivationally) modelling the facts does not correspond to any ordering of the facts being modelled. My own view is that a proliferation of kinds of syntax should be avoided at all costs, on grounds of parsimony. Perhaps we say that all putative kinds of syntax that actually have a semantics should be collapsed into just one kind syntax: syntax-of-semantics. |
| Date Posted: | 12-Sep-2008 |
| Linguistic Field(s): |
Linguistic Theories
Syntax |
| LL Issue: | 19.2782 |
| Posted: | 12-Sep-2008 |
