Discussion Details
| Title: | Re: 15.3231, Disc: Deep Structure/Initial PP |
| Submitter: | Thomas Hoffmann |
| Description: | Philip Carr's note
(http://www.linguistlist.org/issues/15/15-3277.html) actually raises a few interesting questions: If one adopts a computational theory of mind, how can one avoid postulating mental processes/operations? I fully agree with that. If, as assumed , e.g., in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995) syntax is considered an optimal solution to interface conditions (i.e. constraints imposed by the Conceptual-Intentional and the Articulatory-Perceptual systems), then all postulated syntactic steps are interpreted as mental processes/operations. Now, I'm a theoretical linguist and would gladly be corrected by psycho- and neurolinguists, but the way I see it, we nevertheless have the same problems as in the 1960s/1970s: 1. How can we measure the number/complexity of mental processes? Philip Carr mentions the ill-fated Derivational Theory of Complexity (DCT) which assumed that postulated analyses were taken to be analyses of on-line mental operations . As Fodor et al (1974) showed, experimental data seemed to undermine the DCT. One problem, e.g., was that sentences apparently involving more transformations sometimes turned out to be easier to process: in the Standard Theory adjectives in a pre-modifier function such as 'the small cat' were sometimes supposed to be derived from underlying relative clauses, i.e. the cat which is small (cf. Fodor et al 1974: 327). Note first of all, that a lot of the sentences considered more complex in the Standard Theory would receive a much simpler Minimalist analysis (direct merger of Adj in pre-modifier position, no underlying relative clause). So I think looking at the results of the 1960s/1970s experiments and reinterpreting from a Minimalist perspective might actually yield a few interesting results. [For the Minimalist junkies out there: this might not be easy as I first thought. Chomsky (2000) e.g. claims that long-distance AGREE is simpler than MOVE, which actually is COPY+MERGE+AGREE. If we just look at syntax this might suggest that AGREE should be less complex than MOVE. Yet, I wonder whether long-distance AGREE isn t more complex for LF since it involves another PROBE-GOAL search whereas identifying copies of moved elements might be easier.] However, another point is that the human parser might use non-grammar information in addition to grammar, i.e. some kind of heuristic principle (cf. Fodor et al 1974; and as far as I know there are still enough psycholinguists out there subscribing to this hypothesis but feel free to correct me if I'm wrong). So is there a parser that doesn't just use grammatical info and if so, how can we disambiguate the influence of either? Furthermore: 2. What are the predictions towards grammatical complexity and mental work load in other theories? Take e.g. the latest grammatical theory: Construction Grammar (cf. Fillmore and Kay 1999; Goldberg 2003). In Fillmore and Kay's (1999; also in Goldberg's 2003) version of Construction Grammar a sentence can also be the combination/parallel activation of a number of constructions. So Goldberg, e.g., considers 'What did Liza buy the child' to consist of 6 types of constructions: 1)the six lexical items, 2) the ditransitive constructions, 3) the question construction, 4) the Subj-Aux inversion construction, 5) the VP construction and 6) three NP construction (2003: 221). Has anyone ever thought about testing whether an increased number of constructions leads to greater computational work load? 3. And what about neuronal activity? As far as I can see a lot of the 1960 s/1970s studies showed that allegedly higher complexity didn't result in prolonged comprehension time. But what about increased neuronal activity? Has anyone so far carried out an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) study on increased neuronal network activation as an effect of syntactic complexity? And if so, do these studies also contrast production and processing of sentences? Best wishes, Thomas Hoffmann References Chomsky, N. 1995. The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam. 2000. Minimalist inquiries: the framework . In: David Michaels, Roger Martin and Juan Uriagereka, eds.. Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honor of Howard Lasnik. Cambridge,Massachusetts: MIT Press.89 155. Kay, Paul & Charles J. Fillmore. 1999. Grammatical constructions and linguistic generalizations: The What s X doing Y? construction . Language 75,1: 1- 33. Fodor, J. A., T.G. Bever and M.F. Garrett. 1974. The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar. New York: McGraw-Hill. [cf. esp. 318ff.] Goldberg, A. E. 2003. Constructions: a new theoretical approach to language TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 7,5: 219-224. Jackendoff, R. 2002. Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ___________________________________________ Thomas hoffmann Department of English and American Studies English Linguistics PT 3.2.79 University of Regensburg Universitätsstraße 31 D-93053 Regensburg Germany |
| Date Posted: | 30-Nov-2004 |
| Linguistic Field(s): |
Linguistic Theories
Syntax |
| LL Issue: | 15.3342 |
| Posted: | 30-Nov-2004 |
