LINGUIST List 13.825

Tue Mar 26 2002

Review: Psycholinguistics: Glucksberg (2001)

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  • James J. Jenkins, Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms

    Message 1: Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms

     Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 11:04:53 -0500
    From: James J. Jenkins <JJenkinsgc.cuny.edu>
    Subject: Understanding Figurative Language: From Metaphors to Idioms


    Glucksberg, Sam (2001) Understanding Figurative Language: >From Metaphors to Idioms. Oxford University Press, hardback ISBN: 0-19-511109-5, ix+134pp, $27.95, Oxford Psychology Series 36

    James J. Jenkins, Distinguished Research Professor, Psychology, University of South Florida, and Speech and Hearing Sciences, Graduate Center, City University of New York

    Sam Glucksberg, a psychologist at Princeton University, has been doing research on psychology of language for more than 35 years. Some readers will be acquainted with his 1975 book, Experimental Psycholinguistics,(with Joseph Danks) which was one of the best of the early books in the field. Although metaphor was accorded only cursory treatment in that text, it was clearly a matter that Glucksberg could not set aside. During the last 20 years, he has published 23 articles (either alone or with colleagues) on figurative language. Fortunately for all of us, he has brought these studies and many others together in this book to make his case clearly and forcefully concerning the nature of "non literal" language. This is not to imply that the book is merely a review of his own studies. The references range from Aristotle's classics to the year 2000 and freely cross the fields of literature, rhetoric, philosophy, linguistics, and experimental psychology. The book concludes with a chapter by Matthew McGlone (a former student) who contrasts the Princeton position on metaphors with that of Lakoff and Gibbs and offers his view of the Whorfian hypothesis. Although this is a small book (134 pages), it carries a set of weighty arguments and an impressive assembly of experimental evidence.

    Chapter one points out the accepted view of the two major meanings of the term, metaphor. First, it is a type of language that transfers some analogous meaning from one domain to another ("My lawyer is a shark"). Second, it is a form of conceptual representation or symbolization ("Love is a journey"). Glucksberg excludes the many instances of metonymy ("She's got a new set of wheels.") as non-metaphoric. When the only purpose of the literary device is to identify an entity (here, a car) he does not consider it metaphoric. The kind of metaphor that concerns him falls under the first definition above; it's the kind that involves two conceptual domains. A common view is that the term in the "vehicle" domain (e.g., "shark") substitutes for some terms in the domain of the "topic" (e.g., "My lawyer"). Glucksberg argues, however, that this is an undefined set and that metaphoric interpretations are not substitutions but, rather, are constructions from the terms and the context of the conversation. Glucksberg challenges a set of conventional assumptions: first, that literal meaning has priority, second, that figurative meaning is derived from the literal, and third, that metaphorical meaning is more complex and requires more cognitive work than literal understanding. His claim is that all three of these assumptions are incorrect.

    In Chapter two, Glucksberg searches for the supposed differences between "literal" and "metaphorical" comprehension. Experimental evidence is examined concerning two questions: Are literal meanings of sentences processed faster than metaphorical meanings and are literal and metaphorical readings equally obligatory? Evidence over a set of experiments argues that literal readings are faster than metaphorical readings only in the case of poor metaphors. When the metaphors are apt (as independently judged), their processing time is as fast as literal processing. There is also convincing evidence that both kinds of interpretations are generated in parallel; that is, that both literal and metaphorical processing are compulsory. If a sentence can be taken in a metaphorical way, that fact will interfere with and delay the presumed literal processing, showing that the metaphorical processing is active.

    The experiments in this chapter require a bit of sophistication to follow the arguments. This reviewer was impressed with the skill and clarity with which Glucksberg leads the reader through the rationale of reaction time studies, time-accuracy tradeoffs and various other experimental considerations.

    Chapter three tackles the fundamental question of whether metaphor is just a class of simile, that is, just a literal comparison. Is "My job is a jail" to be understood by transforming it into "My job is like a jail"? Or are similes best understood as weak forms of metaphors? Glucksberg's contention is that the basis of metaphor is class inclusion rather than mere similarity. One of the values of metaphor is that it is not necessary that the class itself have a name. Thus, when one says, "My lawyer is a shark," one is saying that the lawyer is a member of a class of aggressive, voracious, predatory creatures. Although one can make a comparison simile out of a metaphor, ("My lawyer is like a shark") it weakens the metaphor to do so. Further, most metaphors are non- reversible whereas literal comparisons should be. An apt metaphor should choose an ideal exemplar vehicle that is prototypic of the desired category thus bringing to mind, or even creating, the proper attribute of the unnamed category.

    The chapter stresses the role of dual reference. An instance can be literal or prototypical of a category. Thus, it is possible to say, "Cambodia is Vietnam's Vietnam." where both the literal use of "Vietnam" (name of the country) and the prototypic use (disastrous military intervention) are quite clear.

    Chapter four addresses the question of property attribution. The central idea of the chapter is that topics have a range of possible dimensions and vehicles have a range of salient properties that might be relevant to the dimensions. In a good metaphor the topic has only a few relevant dimensions of variation and the vehicle has only a few salient property attributes. In a poor metaphor, the topic has many possible dimensions that might be addressed (i.e., it is weakly constrained) and the vehicle does not specify a salient property. Sets of clever experiments that manipulate these variables demonstrate that speed of metaphor comprehension is indeed a function of such constraints. In a neat extension of this paradigm Glucksberg goes on to demonstrate that the same line of reasoning can explain when compound nouns are interpreted as property attributions as opposed to descriptive modifiers. (For example "feather luggage" is interpreted as luggage that is light whereas "feather storage" is a place to store feathers. When the head noun can be taken as topic and the modifying noun as the vehicle, the compound is given a property interpretation.)

    Chapter five takes up the vexing question as to whether idioms can be included in the purview of this approach. The answer appears to be "sometimes." Glucksberg suggests four classes of idioms: Non-compositional idioms are expressions that cannot be analyzed syntactically or semantically. They are not syntactically flexible and their meaning must simply be learned e.g., "by and large." The second class is compositional but semantically opaque. An example would be "kick the bucket". This phrase may be modified as to tense or verb auxiliaries but again, its meaning must be learned. The third class is compositional and transparent. His example is "spill the beans" meaning to disclose something that should have been kept secret. The final class is quasi-metaphorical which is compositional, transparent and is handled by his approach to metaphor. An example is "skating on thin ice" as an instance of a dangerous or risky undertaking. This last case fits nicely into his treatment of metaphor. Members of this class of idioms are expressions that are prototypical of an entire category of events or situations.

    While this chapter gives the reader an intriguing discussion of idioms, it offers little in the way of experimental research. One experiment that is provided, however, supports the overall theme of the book. It demonstrates that quasi-metaphorical idioms appearing at the end of a paragraph of context are more rapidly understood than are literal sentences of the same content. It is also true that modified or altered idioms are processed just as rapidly as their literal equivalents.

    Chapter six, by Matthew McGlone, deals with concepts as metaphors. It is a general consideration of Lakoff's position (Lakoff, 1993) that certain abstract concepts are only to be understood as metaphors (e.g., "Love is a journey", "Theory is a building"). In its strongest form it argues that the metaphor IS the concept and dominates thought and reason. The general argument is that abstract concepts are represented as concrete concepts and are in this way both thought about and talked about. McGlone sees this as another version of the old Whorfian hypothesis. One hardly needs to add that such arguments are usually fatally circular. McGlone rejects both the strong and the weak form of the argument as being without empirical support. He also rejects Gibbs' position (Gibbs, 1994) that one understands metaphorical expressions by recognizing the conceptual metaphors that they instantiate. This view is rejected as cumbersome and unnecessary in favor of Glucksberg's position that allows us to construct attributive categories on the spot.

    Like many discussions of the Whorfian-like theses, there is little hard evidence to support any position on these topics. In a final footnote, McGlone leaves the field open, as is almost always the case: "... we do not intend to deny the role of metaphor in science, art, or more broadly in society and culture. How we talk about the mind, art, people or society both reflects and shapes how we think about those concepts. The argument developed in this chapter is explicitly narrow and is specifically focused on the conceptual metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics. Considerations of the complex relations between language and thought are beyond the scope of this book." (p. 115)

    OVERALL COMMENT The book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of metaphor. It brings experimental research to bear on what might have been thought to be purely "literary" problems. It presents an ingenious, workable theory of metaphor that will impact many fields, beginning most importantly with cognitive psychology and linguistics. It is splendidly reasoned and well written. It is crystal clear about what we presently know and hints at what is still to be done. It is highly recommended. This book is a goldmine.

    REFERENCES Gibbs, R. W. (1994). The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Glucksberg, S. & Danks, J. H. (1975). Experimental Psycholinguistics: An Introduction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

    Lakoff, G. (1993). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.) Metaphor and Thought (2nd Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-251.

    ABOUT THE REVIEWER James J. Jenkins has considered himself a psycholinguist since the summer of 1953 when he was part of a group assembled by the Social Science Research Council to explore the possibility of interdisciplinary research in the domain between linguistics and psychology. He has been adviser to a number of now-distinguished psycholinguists and cognitive psychologists. His current research work is largely in speech perception.