Date: 19-Sep-2006
From: Hanna Pishwa <hannapishwa.de>
Subject: CfP: Volume on Language and Social Cognition
Language and social cognition
Ed. Hanna Pishwa
The planned project is designed to complement the volume “Language andmemory: aspects of knowledge representation” (published in June this yearby Mouton de Gruyter) with a focus on the relation of general knowledge andlanguage (use). The goal of the present book is to proceed beyond merecognitive aspects by investigating the social-cognitive dimensions oflanguage. Therefore, it is intended to complete the achievements ofcognitive linguistics by focusing on social facets of language.Surprisingly, this has been neglected in linguistic approaches with theexception of sociolinguistics, which, however, is located at a macro levelin that it views social groups instead of individuals in situations. Thereason for the consideration of social-cognitive aspects in linguistics iscompelling as social force is ubiquitous and omnipotent in our everydaylife. Practically everything, even cognition and emotions, in people’slives is socially conditioned so that their “responses [are]…triggered bythe social forces that push and pull us” (Moskowitz 2005: 107); some socialpsychologists even argue for a collective memory (e.g., Shotter 1990). Asinteraction is steered by social cognition, we can take for granted thatits medium, language, reflects social aspects as well. Therefore, it is anurgent task to find out how linguistic structure and language use reflectsocial-cognitive aspects in addition to purely cognitive properties.
Social cognition is concerned with the perception, processing andrepresentation of social information with the objective of explaining howhumans understand themselves and others (see single issues below). Thus, itinvestigates “cognitive structure and process—attention, memory, inference,and concept formation—but applied to perceptions of people.” (Fiske 2004:122). Clearly, social cognition has inherited its object of investigationfrom social psychology, while the methods are derived from cognitivepsychology. Consequently, cognitive psychology and social cognition differconcerning the stimuli, which are far more complex in social contexts thanin cognitive psychology. This becomes evident when we compare thecategorization of cups with that of persons: whereas cups are categorizedonly according to their form and function, persons are classifiedadditionally in terms of their traits and roles. The similarity of socialstimuli and cognizers (Bless et al. 2004: 11ff.) adds complexity tointeraction, e.g., the same stimuli may be perceived differently due to theperceiver’s dependence on moods and goals. People construe social realityaccording to their image of themselves, which in turn is influenced bytheir construction of social reality.
Linguistic analyses involving social-cognitive/-psychological topics havemainly been conducted by social psychologists (Heider 1958; Fiedler & Semin1992; Forgas 1985; Malle 2002; Bless et al. 2004: 128-132; Fussell & Kreuz1997; Holtgraves 2003, 2006; Kreuz & Ashley 2006; Robinson & Giles 2001;Berger & Bradac 1982). An example of the employment of social-cognitivetools in linguistics is the investigation of the use of “interpersonalverbs”. They are interpersonal in that the processes and behaviors referredto always imply two human participants. They are classified according totheir degree of abstractness: the least abstract descriptive action verbs(kiss, kick, telephone), more abstract interpretative action verbs (help,hurt, explain), the most abstract, state verbs (admire, hate, like), andadjectives (honest, aggressive, nice), which were judged more abstract thanverbs. The numerous analyses of the use of interpersonal verbs show howlanguage can be employed to explain tricky phenomena in interaction. Usingthese verbs as instruments in a linguistic experiment, Maass et al. (1989)discovered a “linguistic inter-group bias”: the subjects describeddesirable in-group behavior in more abstract terms than undesirablein-group behavior. In contrast, they used more abstract terms to describeundesirable in comparison to desirable behaviors for the out-group. Thedegree of abstractness is meaningful in so far as high abstractness evokesinferencing concerning the addressee’s properties, while a low degree ofabstractness relates to concrete circumstances without activatinginferencing. This relies on a phenomenon called “linguistic expectancybias”, according to which unexpected social phenomena tend to be verbalizedby means of concrete words, while abstract words are considered to beenough for the description of the expected. This finding is in line withthe principle of iconicity. Semin and his colleagues have conductednumerous interesting experiments using these lexical items labeling themethod “Linguistic Category Model” (Semin 1998). The analyses have shownthat the use of these lexical items indicates cause, salience, dispositionetc., issues characteristic of attribution theory (see below). These“tools” (as they are called by Semin) can be employed to discover hiddensocial messages in communication concerning implicit causality ormotivation, for example, in legal contexts because they reveal “howinterpersonal language marks both the features of social interaction andthe properties of persons.” (Semin 1998: 297).
The above example shows that the concern of social cognition is to besought at the micro level, i.e. in the processing and verbalization ofsocial knowledge by individual interactants, rather than at the macro levelas in sociolinguistics. The aim of the volume is to discover morelinguistic “tools” applicable to social contents. The range of toolsshould, if possible, be expanded from words to grammatical structures anddiscourse markers. Recent research has shown that their indexical functionstend to cover multiple contents. The volume is planned as a textbookwritten in a comprehensible way for both non-experts and experts. Thecontributions may be theoretical and/or empirical based on eitherquantitative or qualitative methods or both as not only linguists areexpected to participate but also social psychologists.
Some relevant topics are presented in the sequence of their processing,which starts with attention and is followed by categorization and encodingin memory. The topics are followed by questions, which are merely meant toserve as suggestions.
Abstract due: End of NovemberPaper due: May 2007
Social-cognitive issues and language
Section 1. Perception/attention to social stimuli—does it differ from thatto objects? (Fiske and Taylor 1991, Ch. 7)
Salient properties such as novelty and figure, behavior unusual for theperson/social category, goal-relevance (being a boss, a date), persondominating the visual field etc. attract attention. Negative stimuli aremore salient than positive ones because of the overall positive attitudeamong humans. Interactional consequence of salience: a salient person isseen as influential: she is a causal agent (see also “Attribution theory”).
=> Does the verbalization of salient human properties differ from that ofobjects?=> Do verbal devices for the different kinds of salience or socialcategories differ?=> Language and power
Section 2. Social categories, schemas, frames, and scripts and theirverbalization
Social categories differ from those of nonhuman objects in that theperceived objects are perceivers, i.e., highly complex stimuli (Augoustinosand Walker 1995, Ch. 3; Fiske and Taylor 1991, Chs. 4-6; Moskowitz 2005,Chs. 3-4; Fehr 2005).
i. Schemas: person (traits, person-in-situation, goals), self-, role,gender, event, content-free (containing e.g. causality)=> Are social categories expressed differently from categories for thingsbecause of their complexity—more subtle and vague than non-socialcategories? Do they show clear hierarchies similar to other categories?=> Are verbs used in a variable way in dependence on social categories,e.g. in the context of self vs. others? Are particular linguistic patternsused to symbolize certain schemas?
ii. Person schema: “the big three”: appearance, behavior, and traits(Bless et al. 2004: 311).=> In what respects do person descriptions differ from each other and fromnon-person descriptions?=> (How) do the descriptions of the “big three” differ?
iii. The strong self schema comprising motives, goals, expectancies (Baroneet al. 1997, Chs. 8-10; Fiske & Taylor 1991, Ch. 6)=> Are the self and his/her plans, actions and their outcomes verbalizeddifferently from those of others (see also “Attribution theory” below)?
iv. Discrepancies in expectations concerning social categories and schemas(Moskowitz 2005, Chs. 11-12)=> Verbalization of new, surprising vs. expectancy-congruent socialinformation
v. Priming: evaluative, mood, semantic, analogy etc. (Bless et al. 2004: 60-67)=> Is the cue or the primed information marked in a particular way?=> In what ways is it related to the subsequent information?
vi. Stereotypes: “categories linking attributes to social groups” (Bless etal. 2004:53; Semin 2000; Van Dijk, various writings)
vii. Relational schemas (Baldwin & Dandeneau 2005)
Section 3. Processing of social information
i. Attribution theory: Search for internal or external explanationsfor actors’ behavior (Fiske & Taylor 1991, Ch. 2-3; Forgas 1995, Ch. 7;Moskowitz 2005, Ch. 6-7)
In his descriptions of the perception of other people, Heider (1958), thefather of Attribution theory, observed that “our cognitions, expectations,and actions are based on a mastery of the causal network of theenvironment”. Other people’s actions are evaluated in terms of goals,intentions, and abilities, i.e. dispositional properties, or in terms ofthe external situation. These two alternatives have yielded various“biases” (see below). A further development of this is “Folk theory”conceived by Malle, who argues that people’s explanations are not based onsituation vs. disposition but on their perception of the actor’sintentionality. According to this model, intentional behavior is explainedto be rational, while non-intentional reason is explained in terms of causes.
a) Causality and causal schemas (Malle 2002)=> How (directly) is causality realized verbally in differentconstellations in particular for different persons?
b) Ability vs. effort, external barriers: the use of can – try – may(Heider 1958)
c) Biased attribution: (1) Fundamental attribution error: others’ behavioris explained as dispositional; (2) Actor-observer paradox: explanations ofone’s own behavior are attributed to situation=> Linguistic structures reflecting these – in addition to interpersonal verbs=>In how far do languages reflect cultural differences concerningindividualism and collectivism?
d) The positive sense of the self and self-serving bias: the self is seenmore positively than others; people are more critical of negativeinformation on themselves and tend to accept information that favors them.=> (How) is this expressed linguistically?
e) The future is seen more optimistically than realistic
ii. Processes
a) Dual processing steered by motivation: effortless top-down and effortfulbottom-up processing of stimuli=> Can the kind of processing be recognized in communication?
b) Employment of heuristics; “cognitive miser”=> Can superficial processing be recognized in vague expressions, phrasescontaining expressions for evidentiality and epistemicity — or are theymissing entirely?
c) Social cognitive processing as construal: “Reality is actively built bythe triggering of cognitive, motivational, and affective inclinations thatdirect our perception, attention, encoding, recall, judgment, and behavior.… Interpersonal perception is a dance of mutual construal and prediction.”(Moskowitz 2005: 546)=> (How) Is this reflected in communication?
d) Social closeness and distance
e) Intentions and goals (Fitzsimons et al. 2005; Barone et al. 1997, Ch.11; Gibbs 2001; Malle et al. 2001)
Section 4. Attitudes, evaluations, and emotions
These are essential elements of interpersonal interaction (Augoustinos1995, Ch. 2; Bless et al. 2004, Ch. 7; Fiedler 2001; Fiske & Taylor 1991,Ch. 10)=> How are these verbalized?
a. Attitudes involve emotions and cognition (Ostrom, Skowronski, & Nowak 1994)
b. Since cognizers do not remember the source of their attitudes, theycannot make any statements about it.=>Is this reflected in interaction: do people state the source of theirattitude?
c. Attitudes promote interpersonal attunement => Can this be discovered incommunication, e.g. in the form of rapport (empathy)?
d. Salience of social categories, properties, and behaviors Is there any difference between verbalization on-line and on recall?
e. Interaction (Baldwin 2005; Moskowitz 2005, Ch. 13; Barone et al. 1997)
f. Emotions (Andersen & Guerrero 1997, Forgas 2000, 2001)
Section 5. Social and collective memory
Is it possible to discover a “social or collective memory” in language aswell (Middleton & Edwards 1990, Halbwachs 1980)?
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Linguistic Field(s): Cognitive Science
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