LINGUIST List 6.1214

Thu Sep 7 1995

Review: Paul Deane _Grammar in Mind & Brain_

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    Message 1: Review of P. Deane's _Grammar in Mind and Brain_

    Date: Thu, 07 Sep 1995 09:16:06 Review of P. Deane's _Grammar in Mind and Brain_
    From: <pmfarrellucdavis.edu>
    Subject: Review of P. Deane's _Grammar in Mind and Brain_


    Paul D. Deane, _Grammar in Mind and Brain: Explorations in Cognitive Syntax_, Cognitive Linguistics Research 2, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992, Pp. x + 355.

    Reviewed by Patrick Farrell

    According to Marcel Danesi's reading of Giambattista Vico's _La scienza nuova_ (Danesi 1993), metaphor is crucial to understanding language and cognition. A fundamental principle of etymology is that abstract word meanings develop from concrete meanings via metaphor (see also Sweetser 1990: Ch. 2 and work cited there in this connection), as revealed by the etymology of the word _idea_ (< Greek _idein_ 'to see'). Danesi suggests further that syntax, the most abstract aspect of linguistic conceptualization, is the culmination of this fundamental process of metaphorical projection. Paul Deane's _Grammar in Mind and Brain_ embodies this general view of language and cognition and provides support for this specific idea about syntax, as it is an attempt to elaborate a model of syntactic knowledge based on a version of the Spatialization of Form Hypothesis (Lakoff 1987), i.e., the idea that syntactic structures are metaphorical projections of image schemata from ordinary spatial cognition. More particularly, drawing on the insights into image-schematic cognition, categorization, and conceptual metaphor contained in works by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987) and John Anderson's theory of cognitive processes (Anderson 1983), this study * develops a theory of hierarchical structure and grammatical relations according to which these are projections of PART- WHOLE, CORE PART, and LINK schemata that apply to physical objects; * explores some of the consequences of such a theory for various important issues in English syntax, including the analysis of complementizers and auxiliary/tense elements, complementation structures, raising, control, and _tough_-movement constructions, the distinction between restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses, and _that_-trace effects; * provides argumentation for a cognitive approach to island constraints on extraction in question constructions and shows how these constraints can be explained by the interaction of a theory of attention management and the proposed theory of syntactic structures; and * advances and motivates (with evidence from studies of aphasia) the hypothesis that syntactic knowledge is situated in a neural net in the left inferior parietal lobe of the brain, which accounts for the proposed connection between bodily experience, spatial cognition, and syntax. This endeavor is noteworthy not only for its various analytical innovations and successes in the domain of English grammar and its overall ambitiousness (an integrated theory of cognition, syntactic representation and processing, and neural function), but also for its interesting stance with respect to the question of the autonomy of syntax. D posits representations of constituent structure like those of standard versions of X-bar theory as well as relations between elements in these representations that are quite analogous to the theta-marking, case-marking, and binding of government-binding theory. More generally, unlike in Ronald Langacker's cognitive grammar, syntactic knowledge is not considered to be "indisocciable from other facets of human cognition" (Langacker 1991: 1). Rather, it is claimed to be a specialized form of knowledge, involving a distinct representational system. However, unlike for Noam Chomsky and other generative linguists, it is not held to be an innate module of the mind that functions independently of other cognitive faculties. The proposal is that the same part of the brain that is primarily devoted to processing spatial structure is utilized in language processing, entailing "an implicit analogy between grammatical and spatial knowledge" (47). Thus, D takes a kind of intermediate stance on the issue of syntactic autonomy. Although this book is bound to appeal primarily to the cognitive linguistics community, I see it as an admirable attempt to build bridges between research traditions. It contains information, ideas, and analyses that researchers interested in various aspects of the relation between language, mind, and brain, including syntacticians of all theoretical orientations, should find thought-provoking, at least. D's central empirical goal is a comprehensive analysis of island constraints. The various case studies of grammatical phenomena in English are intended to illustrate and motivate the proposed theories of syntactic structure and attention, which together provide a thorough account of constraints on extraction such as that illustrated by the following examples.

    (1) a. [S' Who [S do you believe [S' that I know _ ]]? b. * [S' Who [S do you believe [NP the fact that I know _ ]]?

    (1b), unlike (1a), involves extraction of an interrogative pronoun from within an NP, which in transformational grammar has been assumed to be ruled out by such principles as the Complex NP Constraint (Ross 1967) or the Subjacency Condition (for example, Chomsky 1986). Simplifying greatly, but hopefully without missing the essence, D's story concerning _wh_ extraction and the contrast in (1) goes as follows. First, a fronted _wh_ phrase is located in the COMP position of the matrix S' and the COMP position and S (the other immediate constituent of S') are mutually linked, which is to say they stand in the same kind of relation as verbs and their complements, for example. Second, by virtue of the fact that these structures are metaphorical projections of the LINK and PART-WHOLE schemata that pertain to physical objects, certain rules of inference apply, most importantly (2).

    (2) If X is linked to Y and Y has parts, then X is linked to some part of Y.

    Third, processing a structure with a fronted _wh_ phrase involves connecting this phrase to some element in its sister S following (possibly multiple) applications of (2). Fourth, successful processing of such a structure is possible only to the extent that the domains in the structure within which the links need to be established are highly active or salient in terms of attention received. Fifth, salience can be achieved in a syntactic structure by spreading activation (in a manner approximating c-command, the heads of sisters of salient nodes are also automatically salient), by being placed in focus, or by being automatically focused by virtue of being highly entrenched (where being lower on a hierarchy of topicality--as in Silverstein 1981--correlates with being more entrenched). Now, in the case of (1b), _who_ is the element placed in focus (of which there can only be one) and it needs to be linked to an element contained in its sister S, following (2). It cannot be linked to the embedded verb _know_ (which it needs to be linked to) because _know_ is contained in an NP that is salient neither by spreading activation (it is a maximal projection rather than a head) nor by virtue of being automatically focused (being a definite, specific NP, it is relatively high on the topicality hierarchy). (1a) differs crucially in that the embedded clause containing _know_ is automatically focused and hence salient, since clauses are low on the topicality hierarchy. There are several interesting aspects of this story, which is representative of D's stories for an impressive range of further constraints on _wh_ extraction. It is noteworthy, to begin with, that the general analysis of _wh_ extraction is quite like standard formalist approaches to this phenomenon, except that the connection between the extracted element and the extraction site is established not through language-specific mechanisms such as trace binding or SLASH feature percolation, but through a cognitive process that occurs in the conceptualization of physical objects as well. This approach also provides straightforward and plausible accounts of various apparent exceptions to the standard island constraints. For example, the acceptability of (3) is attributed (in part) to the relative higher topicality (and hence higher salience) of the specific, indefinite NP out of which extraction occurs.

    (3) Which restaurants have you received [NP suggestions that we patronize _ ]?

    Finally, the key proposals relevant to the analysis of extraction possibilities are independently motivated in compelling ways. The topicality hierarchy and its proposed organization, for example, is shown to be supported not only by numerous previous linguistic studies implicating such a hierarchy but also by evidence from reflexivization in English, the directionality of metaphoric transfer, and trends in children's conceptual development. Similarly, the proposals concerning attention and activation spread are supported by evidence from metonymy and anaphora. Overall, this book is a significant addition to what is now a fairly large body of work arguing for cognitive explanations for phenomena that have been alternatively characterized in strictly syntactic terms.

    References

    Anderson, John. 1983. The Architecture of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Barriers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Danesi, Marcel. 1993. Vico, Metaphor and the Origin of Language. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume II: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ross, John R. 1967. Constraints on Variables in Syntax. MIT dissertation. Silverstein, Michael. 1981. Case Marking and the Nature of Language. Australian Journal of Linguistics 1.227-244. Sweetser, Eve E. 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Patrick Farrell is an assistant professor in the Linguistics Program at the University of California, Davis. His research interests and publications are primarily in the areas of syntactic theory and lexical conceptual semantics.